CONFLICT RESOLUTION
TAMIL EELAM - SRI LANKA
Tracking the Norwegian Conflict Resolution Initiative
"..Unless consistent pressure is brought to bear on both the LTTE and the government, they are unlikely to make serious efforts to change. Although the parties cannot be forced to the negotiating table, points of leverage need to be considered. One point of leverage is aid, an option donor countries have been unwilling to use in the past but which bears another look, given that the Sri Lankan government is now channeling a much higher proportion of its resources into the war. At the same time, it would be helpful for the U.S. to find a way to open a channel of communication with the LTTE, as it has done with other guerrilla groups in the past. The willingness of many countries to concur with the Sri Lankan government’s demonization of the LTTE will not lead to an environment conducive to negotiations, and Washington should avoid such a one-sided approach..." - Miriam Young in Sri Lanka’s Long War, October 2000
"...many peace agreements are fragile and the 'peace' that they create is usually the extension of war by more civilised means... A peace agreement is often an imperfect compromise based on the state of play when the parties have reached a 'hurting stalemate' or when the international community can no longer stomach a continuation of the crisis. A peace process, on the other hand, is not so much what happens before an agreement is reached, rather what happens after it... the post conflict phase crucially defines the relationship between former antagonists..." After the Peace: resistance and reconciliation' by Robert L.Rothstein, 1999
