Home > Self Determination: International Law & Practice > Right to Self Determination - Study Prepared by Hector Gros Espiell, Special Rapporteur of the Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1980 > Foot Notes

Right to Self Determination - Study Prepared by Hector Gros Espiell, Special Rapporteur of the Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1980
- Foot Notes -

Foot Notes to Introduction
Foot Notes to Chapter I

Foot Notes to the Introduction

1 E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.626.

2 A fuller report of the Special Rapporteur’s introductory statement appears in the summary record of the 726th meeting (EICN.4/Sub.2/SR.715-731, 733-735/Add.1 and 736-742).

3 See the report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its twenty- eighth session (EICN.411180), annex 11, p. 2.

4 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 77, document A110309; ibid., Third Committee, summary records of the 2124th - 2132nd meetings, and the provisional verbatim record of the 2400th plenary meeting of the General Assembly (A/PV.2400).

5 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 3 (E/5768), paras. 36.43, and E/CN.4/SR.I 342-1345.

6 For an account of the Special Rapporteur’s statement, see the summary record of the 761st meeting (E/CN.4/Sub.21 SR.761).

7 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No. 6 (E/5927), para. 136.

8 For a summary of the Special Rapporteur’s statement, see the summary record of the 1438th meeting (EICN.4/SR.1438). For statements on the study made in the Commission by the Director of the Division of Human Rights and various mem­bers of the Commission, see E/CN.4/SR.1431, para. 6; E/CN.41 SR.1433, para. 17; E/CN.4/SR.1435, paras. 12-14; EICN.4/ SR.1436, paras. 47-49; EICN.4/SR.1437, paras. 25-27 and E/CN.4/SR.1438, para. 8. See also Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1978, Supplement No, 4 (E/1978/34), paras. 121.125.

9 See the report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its thirtieth session (E/CN.4/1261), chap. XII and resolution 7 (XXX).

10 See E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.813.

11 See the report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its thirty-first session (E/CN.4/1296), paras. 163.172.

12  Idem, p. 60.

13 Racial Discrimination: study by Hernan Santa Cruz, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Revised and up­dated version, 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.XIV.2).

14 E/CN.4/Sub.21384 and Add.1-7.

15 In the present study, the word “resolutions” has been understood in a broad sense as including every kind of formal decision taken by United Nations bodies, regardless of its technical designation.

16 E/CN.4/1081 and Corr.1 and Add.l and 2 and Add.2/ Corr. 1.

17 Ibid.

18 “Mexico deems it necessary to state that it understands ‘peoples under alien domination’ to mean peoples with terri­tories which have been occupied through the use of armed force, in contravention of the United Nations Charter, or in which neo-colonialism has prevented the people or country concerned from following a course of its own. As regards the scope of this definition, emphasis should be placed on the importance, for the struggle against economic colonialism, of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States recently adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, which has been recognized as a vital first step towards elimin­ating anarchy and injustice in economic relations beetween States.”

19 “‘Alien domination’ is understood as covering all forms of domination, both direct and indirect, regarded or declared 'alien’ by peoples of any area and which constitutes an impediment or a suppressive factor in the realization of their fundamental freedoms and human rights, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

20 “According to the view of the German Democratic Re­public, the term ‘peoples under colonial and alien domination’ means nations and peoples which are prevented by a foreign imperialist power employing political, economic or military coercion form exercising their right to self-determination, or whose right to self-determination is impaired otherwise. The term covers in particular peoples or larger groups of people on whom a fascist, colonialist or racist rule is imposed. It also applies to peoples or larger groups of people whose territory has been illegally occupied or annexed by an aggressor. The victims of the various forms of imperialist oppression are entitled to resist with all available means and make use of the support from the international community in implementing their right to self-determination.”

21 “The term ‘peoples under colonial and alien domination’ is distinguished by the presence of a foreign element which leads to economic exploitation in many cases. The relationship being based on the foreign element is a result of historical, geographical and cultural factors, and imperialistic relation. ships are always identified by exploitation and engaging the colonized people to serve the interests and objectives of the colonizing country.”

22 “The Philippine Government considers the term ‘peoples under colonial and alien domination’ to mean peoples residing in territories or areas who have not attained sovereign status and who all within the jurisdiction of the United Nations trusteeship system as enumerated in Article 77 of the United Nations Charter, as well as those non-self-governing peoples within the purview of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.”

23 “The New Zealand Government does not consider that the concept of a people being under ‘colonial and alien domination’ can be defined comprehensively. Primarily the decision as to whether people are under colonial or alien domination must rest with the people concerned. The inter­national community should be receptive to the stated wishes of such a people, and should assist in securing change where change is sought, or accept a situation where the people concerned find the relationship benevolent and mutually satisfactory. It is recognized, however, that the international community has other responsibilities under the Charter in maintaining international  peace and security and in refraining from interference in the affairs of another State. The border­line between the rights of a people under colonial and alien domination and the duties of the international community to acknowledge those rights cannot be stated as a general principle, since each situation is different and must be con­sidered on its own merits.”

24 "...its views on the term ‘peoples under colonial and alien domination’. In this connexion, due regard is paid to the list drawn up by the Special Committee of Twenty-four identifying the Territories to which the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies and account is also taken of the views of the Organiz­ation of African Unity and its Liberation Committee based at Dar-es-Salaam. More specifically, the decisions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council regarding the status and representation in the United Nations of peoples under colonial domination have been reflected in the terms of reference of the Commission and in the various resolutions adopted by it”.

25 "..... for Pakistan, that expression meant clearly that the right of self-determination was applicable to all peoples whose freedom had been illegally suppressed by external forces, near or far, but that that freedom did not include secession of a part of a State unless the association in question had been accomplished illegally against the wishes of the people concerned”. (E/CN.4/SR.1411, para. 4.)

Foot Notes to Chapter I

1.1 See the report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its twenty-sixth session (F]CN.4/1 128), paras. 27-28. See also the report of the Commission on Human Rights on its twenty-ninth session. (Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fifty­fourth Session, Supplement No. 6 (E/5265)).

1.2 In its reply of 13 October 1975, the Government of New Zealand makes the following observation concerning the concept of the right to self-determination and its content:

“The concept of ‘the

right to self-determination’ has been interpreted by the New Zealand Government as a responsi­bility to grant to the peoples of dependent territories that measure of independence which they consider best suited to their needs.

“Implicit in the ‘right to self-determination’, in this country’s

view, is the right of a people to be free from economic exploitation or political domination by another country and to have full and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Recognizing that self-determination includes political, economic, and social factors, a country should have the freedom to establish its own constitution and political status, to control its resources, to establish its own trade relations, and to protect its own cultural and social values by controlling its own educational system.”

1.3 See statement in this sense by the Observer for the Federal Republic of Germany in the Commission on Human Rights on 9 February 1978, E/CN.4/SR.1433, paras. 20 and 21.

1.4  Article 1, para. 2, and Article 55.

1.5 Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (for the text, see Human Rights: A compilation of international instruments of the United Nations (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.XIV.2)).

1.6 Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960, 2105 (XX) of 10 December 1965, 2621(XXV) of 12 October 1970, 2627 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 and 3103 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973. 

1.7 Resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 December 1965.

1.8 Resolution 2734 (XXV) of 16 December 1970, para. 18.

1.9 Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. 

1.10  Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.

1.11 General Assembly resolutions 523 (VI) of 12 January 1952, 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952, 1314 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, 2158 (XXI) of 25 November 1966, 2386 (XXIII) of 19 November 1968, 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, 2692 (XXV) of 11 December 1970, 3016 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, 3171 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973, 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 and 3516 (XXX) of 15 De­cember 1975; Economic and Social Council resolution 1956 (LIX) of 25 July 1975.

1.12 Resolutions 2626 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 and 3362 (S-VII) of 16 September 1975.

1.13

1.14

1.15 “The historical and current development of the right to self-determination on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and other instruments adopted by United Nations organs” (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.625), paras. 52-164.

1.16 See paragraphs 128-134 of the preliminary report and the view expressed by the General Assembly in the Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations (resolution 2627 (XXV), para. 6).

1.17 See, for example, the pages which James Brice devoted in 1921 to the study of the principle of self-determination International Relations, Kennikat Press, Inc., Port Washington, N.Y., 1922.

1.18 Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entered into force on 3 January 1976. Up till the time when this study was published, the following countries had ratified or acceded to the Covenant: Australia; Austria; Barbados; Bulgaria; Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cyprus; Czechoslovakia; Den­mark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Finland; Gambia; Ger­man Democratic Republic; Germany (Federal Republic of); Guinea; Guyana; Hungary; Iran; Iraq; Italy; Jamaica; Jordan; Kenya; Lebanon; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Madagascar; Mali; Mauritius; Mongolia; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Panama; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Rwanda; Senegal; Spain; Surinam; Sweden; Syrian Arab Republic; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; United Republic of Tanzania; Uruguay; Venezuela; Yugoslavia and Zaire. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entered into force on 23 March 1976. At that time, the latter Covenant had been ratified or acceded to by the same countries, with the exception of Australia, Gambia and the Philippines.

1.19 See the report of the Commission on Human Rights on its eighth session (Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/2256)), paras. 20-91.

1.20 Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 28-I, document A/3077, paras. 27-77.

1.21 This historical background is analysed in the report by Mr. Cristescu mentioned above (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.625, paras. 103-118). See also United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rig/its (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.74.XIV.2), pp. 33-34.

1.22 C. de Visscher, Theories et réalités en droit international public, 3rd ed., (Paris, Pedone, 1960), pp. 166-167; B. Mirkini­Guetzevich, ‘Quelqties problèmes de Ia misc en ceuvre de Ia Declaration universelle des droits de l’homme”, Academic de droit international, Recueil des cours 1953, II, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1955, vol. 83, p. 255; A. Cobban, National Self- Determination (London, Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 47; S. Eagleton, ‘Self-determination in the United Nations”, Tue American Journal of International Law, vol. 47, No. 1, January 1953, Washington, D.C., pp. 91-93; M. Sibert, Traité de droit international public (Paris, Dalloz, 1951), vol. 1, pp. 304-305.

1.23 G. I. Tunkin, Droit international public, Problèmes thCori­ques (Paris, Pedone, 1965).

1.24 Adopted on 11 May 1968. “The importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights.”

1.25 E/CN.4/SR.1299, E/CN.4/1300 and E/CN.4/SR.1342, pp. 3-4.

1.26

1.27 See J. E. S. Fawcett, ‘Human rights in international relations”, The study of International Affairs, Essays in honour of Kenneth Younger (London, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 24.

1.28 J. Echeverria, ‘Le peuple comme communauté du manque - Elements pour une definition”, Pour on droit des peoples, collection “Tiers monde en brcf”, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1978.

1.29 H. Gros Espiell, El der echo al desarrollo como on derecho de Ia persona humana (Caracas, Universidad Simon Bolivar, 1978); 1. Rivero, Sur the droit an développenient, UNESCO, SS-78/Conf.-630, Supplement 2, 1978: H. Gros Espiell, ‘Los dereehos humanos y el derecho a Ia libre determinación de los pueblos”, Estudios en honor de Manuel Garcia Pelayo, Caracas, Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1978; UNESCO, international Commission for the study of communication problems, Interim report on cotnmunication pro blems in modern society, prepared for the twentieth session of the General Conference of UNESCO, para. 176.

1.30 See the statement to the same effect made by the represen­tative of France in the Commission on Human Rights on 10 February 1978 (E/CN.4/SR.1436, paras. 3-8). International protection of human rights: proceedings of the seventh Nobel Symposium (Oslo, 1967), summary of discussion, sect. VI (“Self-determination and human rights”), Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968, p. 282. Against: K. J. Partsch, Les prin­cipes de base des droits de l’homme: l'autodetermination, l’egalité ct la non-discrimination”, UNESCO, Les dimensions internationales des droits de l’Iio,nine - Manuel destine a l’enseignement des droits de l'home dans les universités, Paris, 1978, para. 45.

1.31 J. E. S. Fawcctt, “The role of the United Nations in the protection of human rights, is it misconceived?”, International Protection of Human Rights... (op. cit.), p. 97. A criticism of this view is made by Partsch, be. cit., para. 45.

1.32 International Covenants on Human Rights, art. 1, para. 3. Opinion of the Spanish Government in the written statement submitted to the International Court of Justice (I.C.J., Western Sahara: Written statement of the Spanish Government, Madrid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1975, p. 318).

1.33 In its reply to the Special Rapporteur’s request for infor

“The evolution of a dependent country towards self- determination normally involves a gradual transfer of re

“It has been New Zealand’s aim, in implementing the

"(a)

the need to satisfy the requirements of the Declaration on Colonialism;

“(b)

the need to make adequate provisions for those island peoples who wish to retain economic and citizenship ties with New Zealand.

“This country has found that the terms of the United Nations resolutions on self-determination have not always been fully in harmony with the wishes of the dependent people. A measure of flexibility is required to take account, in particular, of the special needs of small territories.

“There is, for example, some ambiguity in resolution 1514 (XV) which states on the one hand, that: ‘All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’, and, on the other, that: ‘Immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non-self-governing territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations’” (para. 5). On the impossibility of requiring a particular degree of political, economic, social and cultural maturity for the granting of indepen

­dence, see Tunkin, op. cit., p. 49.

1.34 Opinion of the Spanish Government in the written statement submitted to the International Court of Justice (see foot-note 32 above); C. llerezowsky, ‘Le problème de la subjectivité internationale”, Mélanges offerts a Juraj Andrassy. (The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1968), p. 45.

1.35 With regard to the question of reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice stated: ‘The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends on the needs of the community.” (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 178). In the case of the Western Sahara, the Court applied this concept to establish the legal nature of the “Belad Chin quiti” or Mauritanian entity (see the advisory opinion on the Western Sahara (J.C.J. Reports 1975), p. 63).

1.36 I.C.J. Reports 1975, pp. 31 and 33. The point was developed at length in the declaration of Judge Nagendra Singh, who shares the Court’s opinion on the subject (ibid., pp. 72-73).

1.37  Ibid., p. 33. In his separate opinion, Judge Ammoun included among such dispensations the case in which the will for self-determination emerges from the armed struggle of a people (ibid., pp. 99-100).

1.38 For instance, in para. 1 of General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970.

1.39  “The principles of the Charter which are embodied in this Declaration constitute basic principles of international law” (Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General part, para. 3, resolution 2625 (XXV). See the report of the Special Com­mittee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (A/AC.125112), paras. 26-29 and 61-78; 0. MikoviC, ‘Principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”, in Principles of Inter­national Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation, M. Sahovic, ed., Belgrade, Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1972, and I. M. Sinclair, “Principles of inter­national law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States”, Essays on International Law: In Honour of Krishna Rao, M. K. Nawaz, ed., (Leyden, Sijthoff, 1976).

1.40 For the principle of self-determination in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, see the advisory opinion of 21 June 1971 on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970) (I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 31). The Court’s advisory opinion on Western Sahara (ibid., 1975, pp. 31-33) analyses the principle in full. The principle had previously been referred to in passing in the decisions of the Court and in the separate opinions of certain judges; for example, in his separate opinion in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company case, Judge Ammoun quoted with approval a statement made by the late Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, at the 1969 session of OAU at Addis Ababa, to the effect that the principle of self-determination was an imperative rule of law (ibid., 1970, p. 304).

1.41 See S. Glaser, “Decolonisation et succession aux traités”, Revue générale de droit international public, Paris, Pedone, 1970, October-December 1970, 74th year, vol. 14, No. 4, p. 906; the report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-sixth session (Yearbook of the Inter­national Law Commission, 1974, vol. II (part one) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.V.7 (Part I), document A/9610/Rev.1, paras. 57-60; the second report of Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur (ibid., 1969, vol. II) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.V.8), document A/CN.4/ 214 and Add.l and 2, paras. 19-23, on the question of deco­lonization as an element in the topic of succession of States; article 1 of the draft articles submitted by Sir Humphrey Waldock (ibid., p. 50) and the same text (article 3) of the draft articles on succession of States in matters other than treaties, submitted by Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui (ibid., 1974, vol. II (part one), p. 94, document A/CN.4/282). See also Hector Gros Espiell, ‘La desnuclearización militar de la America Latina y la sucesión de Estados en materia de tratados” in El tratado de Tlatclolco: Abgunas consideraciones sabre aspectos especiflcos, Mexico, D.F., Organismo para Ia Prescripción de las Armas Nucleares en la America Latina, 1976 (foot-note 21 to this chapter gives a bibliography on this question).

1.42 The lapse or loss of validity of original titles by virtue of new applicable law is a question which has been resolved by so-called “intertemporal law”, In the Minquiers and Ecrenos Case, the International Court of Justice stated: “The Court considers it suflicient to state as its view that even if the Kings of France did have an original feudal title also in respect of the Channel Islands, such a title must have lapsed as a consequence of the events of the year 1204 and following years” (l.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 56). The same doctrine had been expressed in the Island of Palmas Case. Judge Huber had said: ‘As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods is to be applied in a particular case (the so-called “intertemporal law”), a distinction must be made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of law” (United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. II, p. 845). 

In 1953, Judge Gros stated: “A legal fact must be viewed in the light of the law contemporaneous with it (...). When the legal system by virtue of which the title has been validly created disappears, the right can no longer be claimed under the new legal system unless it conforms to the conditions required by that system” (I.C.J. Pleadings, The Minquiers and Ecrenos Case (United Kingdom/France), vol. II, p. 375). In 1975, Judge de Castro, commenting on the Court’s decision on this ques­tion, stated ‘The Court thus judged that the original title ceases to be valid if there are new facts to be considered on the basis of new law” (I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 168). See also the resolution of the Institute of International Law adopted in 1975 and the comments upon this resolution in Annuaire francais de droit international, 1975) Paris, vol. XXI, pp. 1313- 13 17.

1.43 See the report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifteenth session (Yearbook of the International Law Commission on 1963, vol. II (United Nations publication, Sales No. 63.V.2), pp. 198-199, document A/5509, chap. II, sect. B, art. 37 and commentary, paras. (1) to (5).

1.44 See the report of the International Law Commission the work of its eighteenth session (ibid., 1966), vol. II (United Nations publication, Sales No. 67.V.2), pp. 247-249, document A/6309/Rev.l, part It, chap. II, sect. C, art. 50 and commen­tary, paras. (1) to (6).

1.45 Official Records of tile General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Sixth Committee, 905th meeting.

1.46 Note verbale of 27 August 1964. See M. P. Gonzalez, ‘Los Gobiernos y el

1.47  E. de la Guardia and M. Delpech, El Derecho de los Tratados y Ia Convencion de Viena (Buenos Aires, La Ley, 1970), p. 426; J. Nisot, “Le ins cogens et la Convention de Vienne sur les Traités”, Revue generale de droit international public, Paris, Pedone, 1972, No. 3.

1.48 See the report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifteenth session (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1963, vol. II (United Nations publication, Sales No. 63.V.2)), p. 198, document A/5509, chap. II, sect. B, art. 37, para. (3) of the commentary. See the study on this question by 1. A. Pastor Ridruejo, La deterniinacion del contenido del ins cogens (Madrid, Instituto Hispano-Luso-Americano de derecho internacional, 1972), p. 10.

1.49 H. Gros Espiell, Derecho Internacional del Desarrollo (University of Valladolid, 1975), p. 26.

1.50 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Sixth Committee, Summary records of the meetings, 1 180th meeting.

1.51 Ibid., 1183rd meeting.

1.52 See Special Committee (1970) on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, summary records of the 110th to the 114th meetings (A/AC.125/SR. 110-114), 114th meeting.

1.53 See M. Sahovic, “Codification des principes de droit inter­national des relations amicales et de la cooperation entre les Etats”, Academic de droit international, Recueil des cours, 1972, III, Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1972, vol. 137, pp. 302-303; C. D. Johnson, ‘Towards self-determination: A reappraisal as reflected in the declaration on friendly relations”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. III, 1973, pp. 146-163; 0. Arangio Ruiz, “The normative role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations”, Academic de droit inter­national, Recueil des coors, 1972, III, Leyden, A. W. Sijthofl, 1972, vol. 137, p. 441; R. Rosenstock, ‘The Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations: a Survey”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 65, No. 5, October 1971, Washington, D.C., pp. 713-735; P.H. Houben, ‘Principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States” (ibid., vol. 61, No. 3, July 1967, pp. 703-736); Sinclair, Joe. Cit., p. 138.

1.54 General Assembly resolution 2627 (XXV).

1.55 General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV).

1.56 Submission by Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui to the Inter­national Court of Justice in the Western Sahara Case on 16 July 1965 (see ICJ, Year 1975, public meeting held on 16 July 1975 (...) in connexion with the Western Sahara Case (Request for Advisory Opinion) (CR 75/20) (will appear in I.C.J. Pleadings, 1975)). Separate opinion of Judge Ammoun in the Namibia case (I.C.J. Reports 1971, pp. 89-90); Opinion of the Spanish Government in the written statement submitted to the International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara Case (see foot-note 32, above).

1.57 See the separate opinion of Judge Ammouti in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited Case (ibid., pp. 304 and 312); 0. Schwarzenberger, “The purposes of the United Nations: international judicial practice”, Israel Year­book on Human Rights, vol. 4, 1974, Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University, p. 17.

1.58 See B. G. Ramcharan, The International Law Commission: its approach to the codification and progressive development of international law (The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 143- 148; P. Reuter, Introduction an droit des traités (Paris, Ar­mand Collin, 1972), pp. 141-142; L. A. Alexidze, “Problem of jus cogens in contemporary international law”, Soviet Year Book of International Law, 1969, Moscow, Soviet Association of International Law, 1970, pp. 146-149; C. de Visscher, ‘Positivisme et jus cogens”, Revue générale de droit international public, 75th year, vol. 75, January-March 1971, pp. 5 et seq.; G. Tunkin, ‘Jus cogens in contemporary international law”, University of Toledo Law Review, 1971, p. 107; S. E. Nahlik, ‘Jus cogens and the codified law of treaties”, Temis-Symbolac Garcia Arias, 33-36, Facultad de Derecho de Ia Universidad de Zaragoza, 1973-1974, pp. 85-111; A. C. Kiss, ‘Le droit inter­national peut-il être considéré comme volontariste?” (ibid., pp. 75-84).

1.59 At its Eleventh Congress (Madrid, 1977), the Instituto­Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho Internacional stated:“The principle of the self-determination of peoples is an intrinsic element of human consciousness and an integral part of the rules of ins cogens of positive international law.” (Translation by the United Nations Secretariat.) See also: Alexidze, loc. cit., p. 148; the fifth report on State responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur: the inter­nationally wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1976, vol. II, part one (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.V.5 (part I)), document A/CN.4/291 and Add.1 and 2, pp. 31-32, para. 99, pp. 49-53, para. 141 and p. 54, para. 155; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 415; Kiss, Joe. cit., p. 83; G. Abi­Saab, The concept of jus cogens in international law (Geneva, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967), p. 13; J.J. Caicedo Perdomo, ‘La teoria del jus cogens en derecho internacional a Ia luz de la Convencion de Viena sobre el derecho de los tratados”, Revista de la Academia Colombiana de Jurisprudencia, Nos. 206-207, January-June, 1975, p. 272; A. Gomez Robledo, El derecho de autodeternminaciôn de los pueblos y so canmpo de aplicacion (Madrid, 1976); A. Moreno Lopez, Igualdad de derechos y libre determinación de los pueblos: principio eje del derecho internacional contem pa­ráneo (Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Granada, 1977); R. Galindo Pohl, los Cogcns, OEA, Comité Juridico Interamericano, Cuarto Curso de Derecho Internaciona!, Washington, D.C., 1977.

1.60 R. Ago, ‘Droit de traités a Ia Iumière de Ia Convention de Vienne: introduction”, AcadCmie de droit international, Recueil des cours, 1971, III, Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1972, vol. 134, refers to the rights of the individual and jus cogens on p. 324, foot-note 37, and gives an extensive bibliography on p. 321, foot-note 35. See also NahLik, bc. Cit., p. lOt; T. 0. Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties (Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1974). p. 185.

1.61

1.62 See the report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-eighth session (Yearbook of the Inter­national Law Commission, 1976, vol. II, part two (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.V.5 (Part II)), p. 75, docu­ment A/31/10, art. 19, para. 3 (b). Mr. Ago’s draft was discussed at the 1371st-1376th and 1402nd and 14O3rd meetings (ibid., vol. 1, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.V.4). Mr. Ramangasoavina made a special reference to the principle of self-determination (ibid., p. 75, E/CN.4/SR.1374, para. 20).

1.63 Ibid., vol. II, part one (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.V.5 (Part I)), p. 54 (document AICN.4/291 and Add.1 and 2), art. 18, para. 3 (a).

1.64 See the reports of the Sub-Commission on its thirtieth and thirty-first sessions: E/CN.4/1261, para. 163; EICN.4/1296, para. 167.

1.65 See E/CN.4/SR.1410, pp. 14-15 and EICN.4/SR.1411, pp. 11-12.

1.66 See the report of the Commission on Human Rights on its thirty-third session (Official Records of tile Economic and Social Council, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No. 6 (E/5927)), para. 136.

1.67 See the report of the Commission on Human Rights on its thirty-fourth session (ibid., 1978, Supplement No. 4 (E/1978/ 34)), paras. 121-122.

1.68 See Report of time World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (United Nations publication, Sales No. E79.XIV.2).

1.69 In traditional Spanish law and in the law of the Indies, when the law was contrary to natural law the latter was applied and not the law. (See J. de 1. LOpez Monroy, ‘El código civil y Las leyes de lndias”, in El libro centenario del côdigo civil, UNAM, Mexico, 1978, p. 146.)

1.70 E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.626, paras. 153-154.

1.71 General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), para. 6, and 2625 (XXV).

1.72 Declaration of Judge Nagendra Singh in the Western Sahara Case ~.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 80). In this advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice made express reference to respect for territorial integrity, citing paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) (p. 31) and also recorded this view in settings out the grounds for its opinion (p. 68). See 1. A. Carrillo Salcedo, “Libre determinacion de los pueblos e integridad territorial de los Estados en el dicta- men del Tribunal Internacional de Justicia sobre eI Sahara occidental”, Revista Espabola de Derecho lntcrnacionaZ, vol. XXIX, No. 1, Madrid, 1976.

1.73 G. SceIle, ‘Quelques réflexions sur le droit des peuples a disposer d’eux-m~mes”, Problènies fondomentaux du droit international, Festsch rift für Jean Spiropoulos, Bonn, Schim­melbusch and Co., 1957; A. Gomez Robledo, El derecho de autodetern2inación de los pueblos y su campo de aplicación (Madrid, 1976), p. 11.

1.74 See the report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I of the San Francisco Conference concerning the inclusion of the principle of self-determination in the Charter (Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1/1/34 (vol. VI, p. 396)).

1.75 The penultimate preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 2787 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 reads:

“Further considering

1.76 General Assembly resolution 3315 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, annex, art. 7.

1.77 In its reply of 25 August 1975, the Government of Mexico states: “There is a legal obligation to assist all peoples under colonial and alien domination to attain self-determination and independence.” Any action to deny to peoples their right to self-determination constitutes intervention, for under resol­utions 2131 (XX) and 2160 (XXI) the principle of non-inter­vention protects not only sovereign States but also peoples under colonial or alien domination. (S. Bastid, “Remarques stir l’interdiction de l’intervention’, Mélanges offerts a Juraj Andrassy, op. cit., p. 3).

1.78 J. Tomasi, ‘La conception soviétique des guerres tIe libé­ration nationale” in Current Problems of International Law, texts compiled by A. Cassese, Milan, A. Giuffrè, 1975; Y. ~ou­rek, “Enfin une definition tIe l’agression”, Annuaire Iran cais de droit international, 1974, Paris, vol. XX, p. 24; P. Pierson Mathy, La légalité des guerres de liberation nationale, (Hel­sinki, 1970); G. Ginsburgs, “‘Wars of liberation’ and the modern law of nations — The Soviet thesis” in H. W. Baade, ed., The Soviet mm pact on International Law, New York, Oceana Publications, 1965; A. Di Blase, “La Légitimité du recours a la force dans lcs resolutions des Nations tjnies et dans Ia Declaration d’Alger, Pour un droit des peoples, collection “Tiers monde en bref, Paris, Bergcr-Levrault, 1978; I. P. Blischenko, ‘The use of force in international relations and the role of prohibition of certain weapons’; N. Ronziti, ‘Resort to force in wars of national liberation”, Current Problems of International Law (op. cit.). The right of peoples to fight for their self-determination is recognized in a large number of instruments, for instance, General Assembly resol­utions 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, 2787 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 3103 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973, 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, 3382 (XXX) of 8 December 1975 and 31/34 of 30 November 1976. See also Security Council resolutions 269 (1969), 277 (1970) and 282 (1970), to the same effect. In this connexion, see J. L. Iglesias lluigues, “la prohibiciOn general dcl recurso a Ia fuerza y las rcso­luciones descolonizadoras tIe Ia Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas”, Revista E.cpabola de Dereciio Internacional, vol. XXIV, Nos. 1-2, Madrid, 1971, p. 173. The Government of Pakistan, in its reply to the questionnaire, made particular reference to this point, mentioning General Assembly resol­ution 2649 (XXV). In his separate opinion on the Western Sahara Case, Judge Ammoun, commenting on paragraph 59 of the Court’s opinion, stated:

‘The latter paragraph ends by referring to certain in

“The paragraph is certainly in fairly general terms, since it mentions

‘Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is one case which deserves to be mentioned specifically: that is the legitimate struggle for liberation from foreign domination.

‘The General Assembly has affirmed the legitimacy of that struggle in at least four resolutions, namely resolutions 2372 (XXII), 2403 (XXIII), 2498 and 2517 (XXIV), which taken together already constitute a custom. Furthermore the Security Council to has affirmed it in resolution 269

“This recognition by the United Nations of the

‘I upheld this point of view on the occasion of the Advisory Opinion on

‘Nothing could show more clearly the will for emanci

The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (resolution 2734 (XXV)) characterizes the struggle of oppressed peoples as a ‘legitimate struggle” (para. 18) and resolution 32/154 (Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security) of 19 December 1977:

“Reaffirms

The General Assembly, in its resolution 321147 (Measures to prevent international terrorism (. ..)) of 16 December 1977, in reaffirming ‘the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination, likewise reaffirmed ‘the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United Nations” (para. 3).

1.79 Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973, para. 3; resolution ill of the Institute of International Law of 14 August 1975 (for the text, see lnstitut tIe droit international, Annuaire, vol. 56, Session de Wiesbaden 1975, Basilea, S. Karger S.A., p. 544). See F. A. F. von der Heydte, ‘La intervencion en la guerra civil — Anotaciones criticas a Ia resoluciOn del Institut de d roit international “, Temis-Symbolae Garcia Arias, 33-36, Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Zaragoza, 1973- 1974, pp. 443-436; Annuaire francais de droit international, 1975, Paris, vol. XXI, pp. 1319-1320.

1.80 With regard to the matters discussed in paragraphs 91 to 94, see article I, paragraph 4 of Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Owing to its importance, the text of that paragraph 4 is reproduced here. It reads: 

‘The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co­operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” 

See also M. Veuthey, GuCnilla ct droit hwnanitaire, Geneva, Collection scientifique de l’Institut Henri Dunant, 1976). See the points of view of C. Chaumont, ‘La recherche d’un critêre pour l’intCgration de Ia guCrilla an droit international humanitaire contemporain”, Mélanges offerts a Charles Rousseau, la communaute internationale, Paris, Pédone, 1974, and Marks, toe. cit.

1.81 The relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the International Conference on Human Rights at Teheran and the International Conferences of the Red Cross (1965 and 1969), and the work of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, are cited in paragraphs 271 to 274 of this study. See Thai Quang Trung, ‘Le droit international humanitaire en question”, Le Monde, 20 May 1976, p. 8; and J. 1. A. Salmon, ‘La Conference diplomatique sur ha reaffirmation et Ie développement du droit internatio­nal humanitaire et les guerres de liberation nationale”, Revue beige de droit international, vol. XI!, 1976-1, Brussels, pp. 27-52.

1.82 See E. David, Mercenaires et volontaires internationaux en droit des gens (Brussels, University of Brussels, 1977).

1.83 See Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva, 1974-1977), vol. I, (Bern, Federal Political Department, 1978), p. 145. See also A. Vifial Casas, ‘El estatuto juridico internacional tIe los mercenarios”, Revista Espanola de Derecho Internacional, vol. XXX, Nos. 2-3, Madrid, 1977, pp. 289-313.

1.84 General Assembly resolution 2787 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, para. 2. This text originated in a proposal of the Commission on Human Rights to the Economic and Social Council for recommendation to the General Assembly for adoption (see Commission on Human Rights, Report on its twenty-seventh session, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 4, pp. 29, 32, 79, 105-106).

1.85 Resolution 2787 (XXVI), para. 7.

1.86 See ‘Study of the individual’s duties to the community and the limitations

1.87 See the fifth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur: the internationally wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1976, vol. 11, part one (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.V.5) (Part I)), p. 5, document A/CN.4/291 and Add.l and 2, para. 155, draft article 18. Draft article 18 became article 19 of the draft articles on State responsibility (ibid., vol. II, part two (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.V.5) (Part II)), p. 73, document A/31/10, chap. III, sect. B, sub-sect. 1.

1.88 See “Elimination of racial discrimination, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts prepared under Commission resolution 8 (XXVI). Study concerning the question of apartheid from the point of view of international penal law” (E/CN.4/1075).

1.89 Status and Problems of Very Small States and Territories, UNITAR Series No. 3, New York, 1969; L. Garcia Arias, ‘Los mini-Pstados y Ia Organización internacional”, Revista Espaiioia de Derecho Internacional, vol. XXII, No. 4, Madrid, 1969, pp. 811-813, B. Benedict, Problems of Smaller Territories, (London, University of London, 1967); P. W. Blair, The Ministate Dilemma (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Occosional Paper No. 6, 1967); D. Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967); J. Chappez, ‘Les micro-Etats et les Nations Unies”, Annuaire fran cats de droit international, 1971, Paris, vol. XVII, pp. 541- 551; M. M. Gunter, ‘What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?”, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 71, No. 1, January 1977, Washington, D.C., pp. 110-124.

1.90 R. Cassin, Preface to the book of S. Calogeropoulos­Stratis, Le droit des peoples a disposer d’eux-memes (Brussels, 1973), p. 9.

1.91 On this question and its implications for the possibility of very small States, without detriment to their right to independence, being excluded from full membership of the United Nations, a question worthy of study but a very difficult one not so far resolved, see the opinion of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the Introduction to time Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organiz­ation, 16 June 1966-1 5 June 1967 (Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/6701/Add.1)), para. 164, and Gómez Robledo (op. cit.), p. 11.

Mail Us

- truth is a pathless land -

Home