'Pragmatism' may rule the world of power politics but statehood is not a lottery...
Johanna McGreary is right to point out both the nobility of the concept of self-determination, and the less high minded 'pragmatism' which rules the world of power politics. Some six years ago, Tamil Eelam leader, Velupillai Pirabaharan made the same point. He declared on Maha Veerar Naal in 1993:
"We are fully aware that the world is not rotating on the axis of human justice. Every country in this world advances its own interests. Economic and trade interests determine the order of the present world, not the moral law of justice nor the rights of people. International relations and diplomacy between countries are determined by such interests. Therefore we cannot expect an immediate recognition of the moral legitimacy of our cause by the international community."
However, Johanna McGreary's reasoning may be less than sound, when she suggests that the 'bad luck of historical accident is what has left most current claimants (for statehood) out in the cold'. Statehood is not some sort of 'national lottery'.
Often that which passes off as 'luck' is the meeting of opportunity with preparation...
It is true that the historical situation in which a people find themselves will impact on their struggle for freedom. But, states do not come into being by 'luck'. Often, that which passes off as 'luck' is the meeting of opportunity with preparation - and 'bad luck' may be simply a reflection of a failure to prepare adequately and lead effectively.
It was on this that Velupillai Pirabaharan dwelled, when he went on to say in his address on Maha Veerar Naal in 1993:
"The world is constantly changing and there will be unexpected changes. At a particular conjuncture, the international situation may change favourably for us. At that time, the conscience of the world may be conducive to the call of our just cause. In reality, the success of our struggle depends on us, not on the world. Our success depends on our own efforts, on our own strength, on our own determination. The moral legitimacy of the cause alone will not lead to victory. We must be strong, firm in our convictions and skilled in the art of war."
The words of Subhas Chandra Bose to Nehru are, perhaps, not without relevance: if you do not take care to seek solid ground under your feet, you will never be able to stand perpendicular anywhere.
A Jewish academic when asked in Cambridge in 1987 to give a 'short answer' to the question as to how it was that the Jews had succeeded in establishing an independent state, responded: "The short answer is that we never gave up the idea." That unshakeable determination, coupled with years of preparation, found the Jewish people not wanting, when the opportunity for independence arose in 1948, with the withdrawal of the British forces from Palestine. It was a determination which found expression in the eloquent words of Golda Meir to the Jews of the United States on 2 January 1948:
"I want to say to you, friends, that the Jewish community in Palestine is going to fight to the very end. If we have arms to fight with, we will fight with those, and if not, we will fight with stones in our hands. I want you to believe me when I say that I came on this special mission to the United States today not to save 700,000 Jews. During the last few years the Jewish people lost 6,000,000 Jews, and it would be audacity on our part to worry the Jewish people throughout the world because a few hundred thousand more Jews were in danger. That is not the issue. The issue is that if these 700,000 Jews in Palestine can remain alive, then the Jewish people as such is alive and Jewish independence is assured. If these 700,000 people are killed off, then for many centuries, we are through with this dream of a Jewish people and a Jewish homeland."
Today, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam may well say, with equal determination, to more than 70 million Tamils living in many lands and across distant seas:
"We want to say to you, our brothers and sisters, our udan pirapukal, that the people of Tamil Eelam are going to fight to the very end. If we have arms to fight with, we will fight with those, and if not, we will fight with stones in our hands.We want you to believe us, when we say that we appeal to you, not simply to save Tamil lives in Tamil Eelam. During the last decade the people of Tamil Eelam have lost more than 50,000 Tamil lives and many hundreds of thousands of Tamils have been compelled to flee their homeland, and it would be audacity on our part to worry the Tamil people throughout the world, because a few thousand more Tamils were in danger. That is not the issue. The issue is that if the people of Tamil Eelam can remain alive without submitting to alien Sinhala rule, then the Tamil nation as such is alive and an independent Tamil state is assured. If the people of Tamil Eelam are killed off or subjugated, then for many decades, we are through with this dream of an independent Tamil state and a Tamil homeland."
The Kurds were neither the victims of 'historical accident' nor of 'bad luck'...
Johanna McGreary is wrong to dismiss the Kurds in northern Iraq as 'just another bunch of bickering agitators until the U.S. needed them to challenge Saddam Hussein'. The language she uses insults a people who were described by the Minority Rights Group in its report in1975 in the following terms:
"The Kurds are the fourth most numerous people in the Middle East. They constitute one of the largest races, indeed nations, in the world today to have been denied an independent state. Whatever the yardstick for national identity, the Kurds measure up to it."
Kurdish nationalism was not created by the United States. As long ago as 1920, the Treaty of Sevres, imposed on Turkey by the victors of World War I, provided, amongst other matters, for the recognition of Kurdistan. But in the share out of power that followed the ending of the first world war, the Treaty of Sevres was not honoured. Again, the US attempt to use Kurdish nationalism to further US foreign policy objectives is not a recent phenomenon but goes back several decades.
A month after the signing of the Iraqi-Soviet Friendship Treaty in April 1972, the U.S. decided to counter Soviet influence in the region. The Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives (under the chairmanship of Otis Pike) disclosed, on November 1 1975 (almost a quarter of a century ago) that the Shah of Iran had been able to convince President Nixon during his visit to Iran in 1972 that the United States should provide covert aid to the Kurds. After the visit, Nixon ordered the CIA to deliver millions of dollars worth of Soviet and Chinese arms and ammunitions (some of which were collected in Cambodia) to the Kurds. The Pike Committee Report charged:
"The President, Dr. Kissinger and the Foreign head of state (the Shah) hoped our clients (the Kurds) would not prevail. They preferred instead that the insurgents (the Kurds) simply continue a level of hostilities sufficient to sap the resources of our ally's neighbouring country (Iraq). This policy was not imparted to our clients (the Kurds) who were encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise."
The use of Soviet and Chinese arms was intended to secure 'deniability' if the US role was questioned in the international arena.
"... Given the large number of clear instances in which one nation has felt the need to meddle in the affairs of another, short of actual declaration of hostilities, governments have become adept at fighting wars by proxy. In times of notional peace, United States deniable operations are planned and executed solely by the CIA..." (Mark Lloyd: Special Forces-The Changing Face of Warfare -Arms and Armour Press, London, 1995)
In the end, the Kurds failed in 1975, because at that time, they lacked an effective leadership, with the armed strength and the political skill to resist the 'cynical enterprise' in which Iran and the US were engaged. The Kurds were neither the victims of 'historical accident' nor of 'bad luck'. They failed for the same reasons that some Tamil militant groups, overly dependent on India, failed in 1987.
The Albanians like the Kurds, were victims of a cynical enterprise directed to secure the strategic interests of countries far more powerful than them...
Johanna McGeary is also wrong when she asserts that 'no one cared a whit for the Kosovars until Slobodan Milosevic ground them into the dirt.' During the Second World war, Italy united the Kosovo Albanians with Albania. The Albanians supported Italy and Germany in their war against the West. The Serbs of Yugolslavia, led by Tito fought against the occupying German army. At the end of the war, the victorious Western powers found it in their strategic interests to return Kosovo to Yugoslavia.
However, a few years later in 1948, with the sharpening of the cold war, (and long before Slobodan Milosevic was even a gleam in the Yugoslav political landscape), the United States and Great Britain decided to use the Albanians 'to act militarily' against Stalin. Nicholas Bethell, wrote in 1984, in the The Great Betrayal:
"Hardly anyone knows that the United States and Britain chose to make Albania, Europe's poorest country, a secret battleground between West and East, and the central point of their efforts to regain the initiative in the Cold War that began the previous year in 1948....
The Albanian affair was conceived by American and British officials at a meeting in Washington, then approved by government leaders. It was a carefully considered act of policy based on the idea that Stalin would be impressed by a Western decision to act against him militarily even on a small scale and in an outpost of his empire.
The military side began in October 1949 when the first teams of armed British-trained agents were landed on Albanian territory. It ended in the last days of 1953 when the failure of an important American-sponsored mission was publicly revealed..." (Nicholas Bethell, The Great Betrayal, Hodder and Stoughton, 1984, London)
Albanian exiles were recruited to fight for Albania. The Albanian exiles were later to complain -
"(They) complain that their innocence and trust were exploited by the secret services of two powerful and sophisticated countries. They were recruited, they say, on the understanding that the United States and Britain wanted to liberate Albania from communism. And on this basis they were happy to agree. They would fight and they would sacrifice lives, not only their own, but also those of their brothers. wives and children.
They were ready to fight for Albania but for no other cause. And this is why, they say the truth was kept from them. They were not told of the many other reasons why the operation was taking place, about the need to relieve communist pressure on Greece in the civil war, about the decision to retaliate against Stalin's aggressive moves... They were not advised that the conspiracy against communist Albania was no more than a single move in a great game of geopolitical chess and that they, the 'little men, were the pawns most likely to be taken...
American and British intelligence men who took part in the conspiracy point out in reply... In battle it is sometimes necessary to give up a platoon so as to facilitate a battalion's withdrawal. If 'pawns' have to be 'sacrificed' in order to deter an adversary from aggression, then so be it, it must be done. And in extreme cases, when vital interests are truly at risk, the victims must be deceived."(Nicholas Bethell, The Great Betrayal, Hodder and Stoughton, 1984, London)
It is said that the wise learn from the experience of others. The Tamil people are a people, not without wisdom. The Kurds and the Albanians were compelled to learn in the crucible of harsh experience, something of that which had led Subhas Chandra Bose to tell the Indian National Army in Singapore in 1942:
These were the same concerns which led Velupillai Pirabaharan to point out some seven years ago:
