Press Release - Political Committee of LTTE

தமிழ்த் தேசியம்

"To us all towns are one, all men our kin.
Life's good comes not from others' gift, nor ill
Man's pains and pains' relief are from within.
Thus have we seen in visions of the wise !."
- Tamil Poem in Purananuru, circa 500 B.C

Chandrika - LTTE Talks: 1994/95

The LTTE is mindful of the international community's concern in sustaining the peace process in Sri Lanka. The Tamil people themselves have the biggest stake in the peace process, because continuous peaceful life had been denied to them since 1956 when the first mob attacks on them began. Peoples and nations have historical memories which necessarily shape their thinking and attitudes.

When Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga became Prime Minister the LTTE made an unprecedented gesture in welcoming a Sri Lankan leader's election for the first time. On her assumption of office as President the LTTE declared a unilateral cease-fire and called for a peace talks.

When peace talks began, it was understood that priority would be given to attending to the human needs of the near 1 million people in the north, who had suffered privation, lost their livelihood, living as displaced people, due to the war. In fact, the initiative for the agenda in the talks came from the government itself.

The fact that this was inspired by other motives became clear as the talks dragged on. One can understand a ruling party trying to woo the Tamil people over the heads of a liberation movement fighting for their rights. It can be a useful ploy worth attempting. But to describe the granting of basic human rights of life and livelihood to a section of the country's own citizens as "concessions" and "privileges" is surely a hark back to the same attitude adopted by the Sinhalese governments in the past.

In going further to say that "enough concessions and privileges have already been given to the Tamils and that further giving in of anything will endanger the national security", as President Kumaratunga did in her letter to LTTE leader Pirabaharan clearly shows that she equates even such "concessions" with military interests.

The LTTE had from the very inception, called for a mutual declaration of a cease-fire. This is on record. To prolong the cessation of hostilities without moving into the next step of a permanent cease-fire, is obviously a way of keeping the military threat alive. Since the cessation of hostilities does not denote the end of a state of war, the LTTE cannot afford to drop its guard at any given time.

Even on the question of the lifting of the economic embargo (which was the only positive result to emerge out of the prolonged talks) the government was guilty of bad faith on two counts:

While a propaganda blitz was launched from the Colombo and international media, and directed at donor countries, that the economic embargo was fully lifted, not even a fraction of what was agreed and gazetted, has been reaching the Tamil people in the north. The military authorities at the Vavuniya check points have been seeing to that! In Biblical language, it was like the voice of Jacob and the hand of Esau!

Count Two: The government has been using the relaxing of the embargo and fishing ban as a bargaining chip; as was proved even by the recent acts of the government in re-imposing the economic embargo and the ban on fishing, soon after the LTTE withdrew from the peace process. The latest announcement from the government is that the Kilaly route from the peninsula has also been made out of bounds, which means helicopters are free to strafe all boats that use this crossing.

There has been also a propaganda made out from the government side that the LTTE has been making new demands from time to time. Asking old dues is not making new demands. What use is there when the government fails to implement its own promises? Is the government going back on its own agenda not a new demand?

The Kumaratunga government has still not deviated from the policy of its predecessor governments in bottling up the peninsula with a ring of army and navy camps. The request of the LTTE to remove at least the Pooneryn army camp has been consistently rebuffed. In imposing a ban on fishing in Northeast waters, the goverunent is guilty of denying the freedom of movement to the Tamil people both by land and sea. This is another denial of basic human rights as enshrined in the UN charter.

Mrs. Kumartunga's hesitation in sending officially accredited representatives of the government for these talks, and instead in sending personal emissaries who have neither political authority nor government status, has itself made the peace process spurious. Apart from revealing lack of serious intent, it frees the Sri Lankan government, in the present or in the future, of a comittal towards whatever political settlement that is reached. A case in point was Thimpu talks in 1985 when the then President J.R.Jayawardene sent his brother H.W.Jayawardene, a lawyer who held no position in the government.

The LTTE announcement of its withdrawal from the peace process was not unexpected as is being made out. As early as March 16, in releasing 14 prisoners of war, LTTE leader Pirabaharan sent a letter to President Kumaratunga specifically stating that if the outstanding issues between the two parties were not resolved before March 28, they would be compelled to take a decision to withdraw from the peace process. The government chose to ignore the deadline. Realising that the time frame might be too short, and particularly because of what the LTTE noted to be "a positive response" from the President indicating the lifting on the ban on fuel and fishing rights , the LTTE put off the deadline by three weeks for April 19.

On April 10, when the fourth round of talks ended without any positive results, head of the LTTE delegation Thamilchelvan reiterated the LTTE position that under the circumstances, they would be compelled to withdraw from the peace process.

There has been an accusation made against the LTTE that we were not prepared for talks on a political settlement. This is not true. What was constantly emphasised was that while talks towards a political settlement could take a long period of time, the immediate day to day problems of the people had to be resolved here and now, as was agreed to on the agenda. It must be mentioned here that while the government has been talking these past few months about a "political package" that was ready, neither the LTTE nor the country has yet been told what it contains. On the other hand, the LTTE had, through its spokesmen in Jaf~a, and even through interviews with the Colombo media, spelt out the four basic principles of a political solution that would be acceptable to them.

A liberation movement necessarily suffers fi-om a major disability in getting its voice heard through the mammoth weight of a government's propaganda machinery. But should the truth get submerged on the basis that the louder the voice, the greater its credence? In deciding to withdraw from the agreement on cessation of hostilities, the LTTE has not closed its mind, or its doors towards an eventual, durable peace. At the same time it cannot drop its guard, as long as the Sri Lankan government persists with its hidden agenda of a military option. Creating the necessary space for Peace rests on any new initiatives from the Sri Lanka government.