Peace through Change: 
the British Devolution Experience

Peter Hain, Minister of State, Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom 
Speech delivered at the British Council, Colombo, Sri Lanka 
23 November 2000

"This is a war neither side can win militarily. It is a conflict that cannot be resolved without elected leaders being prepared to sit down with people who may well be responsible for barbarous assassinations, but who do have a legitimate political programme which needs to be engaged, not shunned. It took far too long for us to learn that lesson in Britain, and far too many lives were lost as a consequence. 

Equally, the LTTE, like the IRA, need to acknowledge that, whilst a Tamil Kingdom constitutionally split from the rest of the island will not receive recognition by Europe, the USA or indeed India, the principle of self determination and control over most if not all the key policies affecting daily life would be supported by the international community. There is no future for a Sri Lanka paralysed by dogma, intransigence and cruelty. Compromises, difficult decisions and tough choices will be needed, some painful..."

UK is keen to help in the search for a peaceful settlement... I would like to share with you some of the experiences that we have had in the UK, particularly in the context of Northern Ireland... I firmly believe that Devolution will not lead to the break up of the nation state... How devolution came to Northern Ireland... Three strands of the Good Friday Agreement... How to negotiate with those speaking for paramilitary groups... Two issues in any peace process are paramilitary prisoner release and decommissioning of weapons... Three factors that helped achieve Agreement: conflict weariness, strong public yearning for peace and international involvement... Also nothing was agreed until everything was agreed... Both Sri Lanka's insistence upon territorial sovereignty, and the LTTE's objective of autonomy, can be secured... This is a war neither side can win militarily: this is a time for boldness, vision and strong leadership from both sides... see also: "...many peace agreements are fragile and the 'peace' that they create is usually the extension of war by more civilised means... A peace agreement is often an imperfect compromise based on the state of play when the parties have reached a 'hurting stalemate' or when the international community can no longer stomach a continuation of the crisis. A peace process, on the other hand, is not so much what happens before an agreement is reached, rather what happens after it... the post conflict phase crucially defines the relationship between former antagonists. Hence the title, After the Peace.." (Walter Kemp, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, reviewing 'After the Peace: resistance and reconciliation' by Robert L.Rothstein, 1999)

UK is keen to help in the search for a peaceful settlement...

It is a great pleasure for me to be here today. This is my first visit to Sri Lanka and it is a good opportunity for me to get to know key opinion formers and to learn about the issues of the day. 

Everyone I speak to agrees that the top priority on the political and economic agenda is to find a lasting solution to the ethnic conflict. I have followed events in Sri Lanka with considerable interest and sadness as a friend with a shared history and common values, and a fellow member of the Commonwealth family. It is a tragedy to see so many lives being lost and development opportunities missed as a result of this destructive conflict.

The UK is keen to help in the search for a peaceful settlement to this complex problem if we are asked to do so. But the solution must come from within Sri Lanka if it is to be sustainable. There is no magic wand that people from outside can wave to make things better. So I have not come here with any preconceived ideas on what form a settlement might take; that is a matter for the Government and the people of Sri Lanka.

But others have also experienced internal conflict and have searched for ways of giving different communities a greater say in the governance of their own affairs within a unitary state. 

I would like to share with you some of the experiences that we have had in the UK, particularly in the context of Northern Ireland...

I would like to share with you some of the experiences that we have had in the UK, particularly in the context of Northern Ireland. I do this, not because I want to suggest that the formula we have developed in Northern Ireland must necessarily be the right one for the Sri Lankan context - but because we have encountered some of the problems that you face and there may be something of value in that experience which you can draw upon.

Since our Labour Government came to power in 1997, we have devolved power to Scotland and Wales and, as part of a Peace Process to Northern Ireland as well. Each has a different model of devolution. The Scottish Parliament has fully fledged legislative powers over most things, excluding foreign and defence policy and social security. The Welsh Assembly has more limited control over key areas like education, health and economic development. The powers of the Northern Ireland Assembly fall midway between those of Scotland and Wales.

Conflicts around the world - for example, in the Middle East, Kashmir, Western Sahara, the Balkans, South Africa, Indonesia and Spain - have some similarities. But each has its own unique history demanding its own unique solution.

Nevertheless we can learn lessons and draw from each others experiences. I would like today to concentrate on how the United Kingdom has worked towards a negotiated settlement in Northern Ireland, following centuries of bitter conflict, horrendous violence, terrorism, discrimination and injustice. 

We have not yet secured a genuinely lasting peace embraced by all. But we are making significant progress which just a few years ago would have been regarded as impossible. And if Sri Lankans continue to despair about the prospects for peace in their own beautiful island, they can take courage from the fact that the conflict in Northern Ireland goes back much longer and has been at least as bitter and entrenched.

I firmly believe that Devolution will not lead to the break up of the nation state...

But first, the principle, of devolution itself. Some ask: will it not ultimately lead to the break up of the nation state?

I firmly believe that it will not. Our devolution arrangements respect the history, culture and tradition of different parts of the United Kingdom. They strengthen not weaken our Union. The arrangement which we have put in place seek to devolve to the constituent parts of the UK the power to manage their own affairs in the areas which are of most concern to the local populations. At the same time, they reserve for the national government the tasks which are best performed at the national level.

The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, recently commented: 

"Devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, alongside changes under way at regional and local levels in England, have all strengthened the ability of each part of the United Kingdom to find solutions which meet theirparticular needs while maintaining the integrity of the United Kingdom and respecting the common interest and traditions which bind us all together, wherever we live."

Devolution has required courage, but it is the forging of a new, modern Britain - a strong, multinational, multicultural and multiethnic country, where our strength comes not from uniformity but from diversity; not from a flattening process of programmed assimilation, but from a democratic renewal through mutual tolerance and respect. I believe that devolution, rather than undermining the UK, will actually strengthen it.

I fought apartheid in the old South Africa because I hated racism and I believed in equality; justice, pluralism and the dignity of all ethnic and religious groups. I know that the Sri Lankan people share these beliefs and care deeply about their diverse cultures, languages and traditions. 

Nelson Mandwela's "rainbow nation" vision for South Africa is a vision the British Government shares and we are proud to be a multicultural, multiethnic, multi faith and indeed multinational state. Devolution is one example of how that vision is put into practice.

I hope devolution will awaken a greater civic interest and encourage people to participate in determining their own local affairs. By recognising and accommodating the diversity that exists in the UK, by allowing its various parts to do things differently, I believe we strengthen the UK. It is this ability to adapt and adjust, to evolve and improve in response to changing circumstances, that has been the hallmark of democracy in Britain. I hope it will be a model, which your island will share.

How devolution came to Northern Ireland...

So how did devolution come to Northern Ireland? In 1801 the marriage of Great Britain and Ireland created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Britain's rule was often violent and oppressive. By the second half of the 19th Century, "home rule" (or devolution) for Ireland had become one of the major issues of British politics. From 1886 onwards the Liberal Government made several unsuccessful attempts to legislate for Irish Home Rule.

In the aftermath of the First World War, the British Government finally legislated for Home Rule. However, by then the pressure for a completely independent Irish State was overwhelming and in 1921 the Irish Free State, later to become the Republic of Ireland, was established in the South. However, the six counties of the North were not included; they were left as part of the United Kingdom and were granted their own devolved parliament and govemment.

These six counties of Northern Ireland were dominated by the majority Protestant community (roughly 60% of the population).

Historically, the Protestants identify closely with Britain and are known as Unionists, as they favour the union between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. The minority Roman Catholic population tend to identify with the independent Republic of Ireland to the south and are known as Nationalists. After 1921 the Nationalists were effectively excluded from power by a Unionist majority which ruled with intolerance, injustice and blatant discrimination against Catholics.

A distinguishing factor of Northern Ireland is its long tradition of violence for political ends. It was against this background of growing violence that the devolved government was suspended in 1972 and direct rule from London put in its place. Civil and human rights were also an important factor 30 years ago at the start of the so called Troubles. Until reform began in the 1970s Roman Catholics were regularly the victims of discrimination, for example in gaining access to public housing and to jobs in both the private and public sectors.

Throughout the ensuing years, successive British governments, both Labour and Conservative, and the main political parties in Northern Ireland have looked for a way to restore a measure of self rule which would ensure the interests and rights of the minority community were fully represented. The history of the negotiations which led to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement is long and complex.

But it is marked by a recognition by successive British - and Irish - Governments, of whatever party, that an enduring solution can only come about if institutions are established which are accepted as legitimate across the whole community. This essentially bipartisan approach over many years, both within the UK and Ireland, and between our two Goverments, has been important in achieving success. The Agreement now offers Northern Ireland the best chance of peace in a generation.

Three strands of the Good Friday Agreement...

So what is the Good Friday Agreement?

It deals not only with the political relationships within Northern Ireland, but with Northern Ireland's relationships with the Republic of Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. This took the form of the so called Three Strand Approach, which is at the heart of the Good Friday Agreement, and as a concept had been around in talks going back at least as far as 1991.

Strand One has produced the involvement of both communities in the devolved Govemment of Northern Ireland: the sharing of power. The Agreement established an Assembly elected by proportional representation capable of exercising executive and legislative authority with safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all parties within the community.

Strand Two has established structured co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The form agreed includes a Council made up of Ministers from the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Republic of Ireland, plus cross border bodies handling specific subjects with all Ireland implications.

Strand Three establishes new institutions to handle both bilateral relations between London and Dublin and also a British Irish Council, bringing together representatives of the British and Irish Governments and the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Underlying the Agreement is the acceptance by all, that the people of Northern Ireland are free to choose whether to remain part of the United Kingdom, as a majority clearly want at present, or to become part of an independent united Ireland. Also an acceptance that all parts of the community are free to pursue their differing aspirations, as long as they do so by exclusively peaceful and democratic means.

But the Agreement goes further than simply issues of national identity, the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and political representation, vital though they are.

It is also about Northern Ireland's future being one of fairness, justice and opportunity for all. Those elements are particularly important to ordinary people in Northern Ireland, particularly those from the minority nationalist community, who in the past have been denied agreed rights.

The Agreement ensures that the human rights of all sections of the community in Northern Ireland are fully recognised and protected. It is about creating new and inclusive social structures in Northern Ireland to ensure justice, fairness and equality for all sections of the community.

How to negotiate with those speaking for paramilitary groups...

So how did we achieve a process which produced this Agreement? How did we manage to negotiate with those speaking for paramilitary groups, most notably the IRA, which had only recently been responsible for horrendous acts of terrorism and assassination? A question perhaps of special interest to Sri Lankans.

The main challenge confronting all the democratic participants in the negotiations was how to involve parties closely associated with terrorist organisations. There was a natural concern about engaging in direct negotiation with political representatives associated with organisations responsible for terrorist campaigns. Some of those who ended up talking across the negotiating table had relatives or neighbours who had died in terrorist attacks.

The approach that we took as a Government was that those parties had to affirm their total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means. Ceasefires declared by their paramilitary wings had to be seen to be genuine and lasting. Transgressions from ceasefires led to the suspension of participants from the talks on two occasions.

Deciding when a paramilitary group's ceasefire is genuine and lasting, rather than simply a short term tactic, is probably the hardest judgement confronting any government in initiating a negotiating process of the type we have seen in Northern Ireland. Such paramilitary organisations, by their very nature operate in a political culture difficult to understand from the outside. They naturally tend to be secretive, authoritarian and undemocratic. Nonetheless in the case of Northern Ireland, the paramilitary groups' views were a reflection, albeit an extreme one, of the passionately held views and tensions of a deeply divided society.

There is almost bound to be an element of ambiguity about any halt to violence. But it is essential to tie those who want to give up violence into a position where it is virtually impossible for them to go back.

They need to be locked into a political process which gives them the opportunity to achieve at least part of their objectives. At the same time governments need to be very clear in their own minds about their own basic principles and what their bottom line is. With this firm framework in place, one can then try to be inventive in coming up with initiatives to keep the process moving forward, including for example, over such issues as agreeing to meet with the paramilitaries' political representatives, talks about talks and so on.

Two issues in any peace process are paramilitary prisoner release and decommissioning of weapons...

Two particular issues almost certain to come up in any peace process of the kind seen in Northern Ireland are paramilitary prisoner release and decommissioning of weapons.

The early release of paramilitary prisoners is always likely to be controversial. But it can form an important part of the process of binding former terrorists into the democratic process. This was a key part of the Good Friday Agreement. Without it, it is unlikely a
broad based, sustainable settlement could have been achieved.

Decommissioning of weapons is also an integral part of the Good Friday Agreement. The people of Northern Ireland want and deserve reassurance that there is an end to violence for good. Decommissioning has not yet happened, but as a first step the IRA opened some of their arms dumps in June 2000, to two eminent independent, international inspectors, who carried out a second inspection of these dumps in October.

Three factors that helped achieve Agreement: conflict weariness, strong public yearning for peace and international involvement...

Finally a few thoughts on the actual talks process itself and some of the elements that helped achieve Agreement. Conflict weariness on the part of the paramilitaries after 30 years of conflict, and the acceptance that they could not achieve their aims by violence, was undoubtedly a factor. 

The strong public yearning for peace has also been crucial, both in encouraging the politicians in their search for a solution and in underpinning the Agreement once reached. This has manifesto itself both in the findings of opinion polls but also in the establishment and growth of many non Governmental voluntary and self help groups that have worked to bring about reconciliation between the communities, in many cases by devoting their efforts to practical, grass roots projects.

An integral part of the process was the  involvement of the  international community. A major role was played by various distinguished international figures. Central to success was the participation of formor US Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, as Chairman of the Good Friday Agreement negotiations; his co Chairman, ex head of the Canadian Armed Forces General John de Chastelblain; and former Prime Minister of Finland, Harri Holkeri. All played an important, manifestly neutral role in facilitating the negotiations.

Patience, patience, and yet more patience were perhaps the most important of the many qualities Senator Mitchell and his colleagues brought to the process. Senator Mitchell returned to Northern Ireland yet again in the autumn of 1999 to conduct a review of the implementation of the Agreement, which produced the breakthrough allowing for the establishment to the Agreement's various institutions.

General de Chastelain has continued his involvement as Chairman of the Independent International Decommissioning commission, where his two colleagues are a former US diplomat and a senior Finnish army officer with past experience of decommissioning in the Balkans. The Patten Commission on police reform also included 3 international members, each with specific expertise on policing issues, two from the US and one from Canada.

Similarly the Tribunal set up to look into the events of Bloody Sunday in 1972, when 13 civilians were killed during a demonstration in Londonderry, is being conducted by three Senior judges, one British one Canadian and one Australian.

This international involvement has helped reassure members of both communities: being seen as having the necessary expertise for the task; and as clearly free of any bias towards one community or the other.

But the commitment and determination of the political leaders of Northern Ireland was probably most important in achieving an Agreement in the end. 

They showed an extraordinary courage in setting aside the hatreds and violence of 30 years, in which some had been directly involved, to hammer out an agreement. 

The actual talks process leading to the Good Friday Agreement lasted on and off for over 2 years, although many of the ingredients in the final Agreement had been the subject of negotiations going back several years before this. In the end setting a firm and realistic deadline, in this case Easter 1998, also helped concentrate minds. The high level personal involvement of both the British and Irish Prime Ministers in the final stages, as well as the intervention of President Clinton at crucial moments, was also a key to success.

Also nothing was agreed until everything was agreed...

It was also essential, and reflected a lesson learned from previous attempts, that all parties understood that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed. This gave parties confidence to explore areas of possible agreement with less fear of compromising on their fundamental objectives. In other words they knew that they would not be left at the end of the process, having made concessions in some areas without getting something in return.

In the end no party got everything they wanted in the Agreement. Compromise was essential in order for it to be achieved. Compromise, co-operation, commitment and courage are all qualities that will be needed if the new institutions established under the Agreement are to work.

The Good Friday Agreement and Northern Ireland devolution are now in business. Society is returning to normal. Positive changes can be seen in the economic climate and in the spirit and hopes of the people. But there are still problems to be solved. More work is needed on all sides to consolidate the gains that have been made. But in the long run I believe Northern Ireland will prove that force can never supplant democracy as the solution to our differences.

Both Sri Lanka's  insistence upon territorial sovereignty, and the LTTE's objective of autonomy, can be secured...

Devolution is new to the UK and it is in its infancy. We have made bold and radical changes to the way the UK A governed. The establishment of devolution has required much effort and continues to challenge us as we adapt to changing circumstances.

If our experience is useful to you, we are more than happy to share it. Sri Lanka has suffered enough from a long and destructive conflict, which has drained the island's material, emotional and moral resources for the past 18 years. No two conflicts are the same: Sri Lanka must find its own solution to its own problem. But I cannot emphasise strongly enough the need for patience and a properly thought out process, which gives all section of the community an opportunity to contribute to the search for peace.

Britain stands ready to help Sri Lanka in any way we can, and remains fully supportive of Norwegian peace facilitation efforts in its dialogue with the Government and the LTTE. I am convinced that both the Government's insistence upon the territorial sovereignty of the whole island, and the LTTE's objective of autonomy, can be secured. But for that to happen the shooting must stop and the talking must start.

This is a war neither side can win militarily: this is a time for boldness, vision and strong leadership from both sides...

This is a war neither side can win militarily. It is a conflict that cannot be resolved without elected leaders being prepared to sit down with people who may well be responsible for barbarous assassinations, but who do have a legitimate political programme which needs to be engaged, not shunned. It took far too long for us to learn that lesson in Britain, and far too many lives were lost as a consequence.

Equally, the LTTE, like the IRA, need to acknowledge that, whilst a Tamil Kingdom constitutionally split from the rest of the island will not receive recognition by Europe, the USA or indeed India, the principle of self determination and control over most if not all the key policies affecting daily life would be supported by the international community. There is no future for a Sri Lanka paralysed by dogma, intransigence and cruelty. Compromises, difficult decisions and tough choices will be needed, some painful.

This is a time for boldness, vision and strong leadership. The Sri Lankan people deserve no less from their leaders, both Sinhalese and Tamil.