30 April 1988

India's Influence as a Major Regional Power
and The Reasons for The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

A. Jeyaratnam Wilson
Professor of Political Science
University of New Brunswick

In the first place, I would refer to India as the major super power in South Asia, not as a major regional power. Dismembered Pakistan, heavily militarised by U.S. weaponry is also a major regional power. But India has command over larger resources and has the world's fourth largest standing army. India as a major super power is in a category of one, there being no such regional super power in the globe, neither China, nor South Africa nor Israel, nor any one of the West European states or of the South American. One reason is India's overwhelming dominance among powers that are less strong. Another is that India's policy makers have deliberately sought to create such a position for India in the subcontinent.

Two factors must be taken into account in what I would call Indian hegemony over the subcontinent. One is the cultural imperative. Therefore India regards her immediate neighbours, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Pakistan as the cultural expressions of Indian unity.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru himself in one of his prison musings described India as a cultural unity. In unstable domestic situations when foreign adventure may provide some distraction to India's politicalised class which sustains India's political structures, and in unstable international conditions where the Indian ruling class is uncertain of foreign policy objectives of neighbours sensitive to foreign penetration, the idea that the sub continent is one cultural entity could provide the rationale for aggressive assertions of India's dominance over the region.

Together with this cultural impetus for action, post-independent India is very much influenced by the imperative of one of the sternest of British Viceroys that India had, Lord Curzon who always held to the opinion that the Indian subcontinent is one strategic unity.

Britain's heirs, India, being the dominant successor, the men of the Indian National Congress and their bureaucratic functionaries took into consideration the cultural and strategic imperatives in the pursuit of foreign policy.

In March-April 1947, Nehru complaining at the Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi stated that "the neighbouring countries, even culturally look towards Europe and not to their own friends and neighbours (Nehru meant India) from whom they had derived so much in the past.¹

Within a short time, the Indian Prime Minister for all his neutralism and nonalignment, brought India's weakest neighbours under Indian suzerainty. In August 1949, India signed a Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship with Bhutan. India guaranteed non- interference in the internal affairs of Bhutan. Bhutan in turn pledged to be guided by India's advice in external relations.

Sikkim suffered a worse fate. One 5th December 1950, India signed a Treaty of perpetuity with Sikkim which made Sikkim an Indian protectorate. I would say that the cultural, and more importantly, Lord Curzon's strategic imperative, had determined India's interventional role.

Under Mrs Indira Gandhi, India took several steps beyond what her father, Mr Nehru had accomplished. These were deliberately intended to establish India's hegmonistic, not merely dominant role, in the subcontinent. Mrs Gandhi set the stage for implementing her policies when, while in opposition during 1977- 79, she accused Morarji Desai's Janata government (1977-79) of appeasing India's neighbours "so much, that even tiny countries like Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh are showing eyes at us".²

Earlier in 1972, not so much in pursuit of cultural or Lord Curzon's strategic imperative, Mrs Gandhi freed Bangladesh from Pakistan President Yahya Khan's tyranny. In this case she had no alternative since 10 million refugees from Bangladesh crossed into India. A year before, in August 1971, Mrs Gandhi signed her Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in August 1972 in which the high contracting parties agreed to come to each other's assistance if the other is attacked. The agreement, however, was at that point in time not a step towards the cultural-strategic nexus.

When Mrs Gandhi was firmly ensconced in office after winning a victory in the aftermath of the Bangladesh war (1972-77) and after her defeat of the Janata Party government (when she again became Prime Minister, 1979-84) the firm outlines of the hegemonistic role of a regional superpower were drawn. Firstly, she indicated her version of a Monroe Doctrine for South Asia. There were three aspects, two of which Mr Rajiv Gandhi applied to the Sri Lanka situation:³

1. The doctrine held that "South Asia was a troubled region emphasising that in the context "Indian interests must be protected".

2. If law and order breaks down in a neighbouring state, India's assistance should be sought to arrest the destabilizing process; help could be solicited from within the region but not to the exclusion of India.

3. Mrs Gandhi stated that a national consensus had been obtained between her Congress (I) party and other political parties. India, the contention was, could not be excluded in regional developments which involved regional security. Indian concerns relating to U.S. military assistance to Pakistan were thus spelled out. To provide meaning to this new doctrine, Mrs Gandhi shifted India from the non-aligned state of Mr Nehru to a national security state. The chief features of the national security state were:⁴

(a) high defence spending at the expense of developmental needs

(b) high mobilisation of national energies against an external threat, often imaginary.

(c) an atmosphere or beleagueredness, and therefore an expansionist foreign policy, supposedly to break out from the encirclement.

The three pillars of India's hegemonistic stature as a regional superpower therefore stand on (1) the cultural and strategic imperative (2) Mrs Gandhi's Monroe doctrine and (3) Mrs Gandhi's inauguration of the national security state. Thus the ghost of Lord Curzon walks the corridors of the South Block in New Delhi.

It is now an Indian supposition that Mr Gandhi's policies relating to Sri Lanka are a continuation of Mrs Gandhi's policies. But even with Mrs Gandhi there were obstacles from the major powers in the region (especially Pakistan and China) and at least one of the superpowers, the USA; these powers did not concede India this status. India's Sri Lanka exercise cannot therefore be taken as absolute proof that Washington, Moscow or for that matter Beijing and the rest of the Western world had accepted New Delhi as the major regional power leave alone superpower. At best these states expected India to settle the Sri Lankan dispute amicably.

I have secondly been asked to explain to you the reasons for the Accord of July 1987. I can, in the absence of evidence, other than the document itself, only draw inferences.

In the first place, President Jayewardene has in his interview with S. Venkat Narayan (Island International, 23rd December 1987) stated that the letters of exchange between the Indian Prime Minister and him are only intentions. These he stated, need to be translated into a treaty. The President said that he wanted to sign a treaty of peace and friendship with India and that the treaty was in connection with the annexures (that is the letters) attached to the Accord of July 1987. And he added rather ominously: "if India wants us to do certain things, we also want India to reciprocate by doing something for us." What are these things and what things will the President not do.

He said that the question of Trincomalee is a quid pro quo and will depend on the terms of the treaty. He added that foreign trainers in his country (the Israelis, Keeny Meeny Services and the Pakistanis) will remain until a treaty is concluded. The same applies to the Voice of America broadcasts. The negotiation of such a treaty cannot be accomplished before the President's term ends in November this year and officially on 4th February 1989. Two of his possible successors, the Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa and the Minister of National Security, Lalith Althulathmudali, are opposed to the treaty.

Then why or what were the reasons for Mr Gandhi over committing his prestige on this Sri Lanka operation? My first answer is that the Indian Prime Minister did not receive the right advice from those who counselled him. In the military venture of this kind, Mr Gandhi should have obtained bipartisan agreement between the main parties in his own country.

On the other hand Indian opinion is divided on the wisdom of continuing the war. The major parties of Tamil Nad, Andra Pradesh and V P Singh's organisation question the wisdom of the military adventure. War some times it is said is a reflection or extension of domestic policy.

But elections in distant Haryana state were not intended to give Mr Gandhi leverage on what went on in Tamil Ceylon. The forthcoming elections in Tamil Nadu might bring the role of the IPKF to the fore; it certainly will be one of the issues. But Mr Gandhi is not likely to obtain much credit. The reasons are that Mr Gandhi and the IPKF have committed three errors.

1. Mr Gandhi overcommitted his enormous reputation as a leader of the world's largest democracy in undertaking an open-ended military operation which has cost the Indian Army severely. It has given him little return.

2. The IPKF did not use, what in nuclear warfare is called, the ladder of escalation to warn the militant groups and the Ceylon Tamil civilian population of the dangers that lay ahead at the stages when the Indian Army would step on to the next phase of it's campaign. Instead, the Indian Army went for all out victory. In this connection, I have a serious accusation against the Indian Army which I feel must be thoroughly investigated by a body of international military experts. My information is that the Indian Army tested some of its new weapons on the innocent Tamil people of Jaffna and that they continue to do so now in the Eastern Province. This is, if true, a terrible indictment against a Government and an Army which claimed to be entering the Tamil areas to provide the Tamil people protection. I repeat this charge. My information is reasonably authentic. An international body of military experts can give us the facts or reject the views that have come to me.

3. Before a politicalised military operation is set in motion, the parties to the dispute must be consulted. The Indian Government has acted hastily and thoughtlessly. There is no evidence that the Sinhalese Opposition parties were asked for their views nor was any attempt made to negotiate with their leaders. Thus the Sinhalese people are generally hostile to the Indian presence. In an operation of this kind, at the least, one friend might be helpful. The only people, the Tamils who first welcomed the Indian Army are now not with them.

This leaves Mr Gandhi with only President Jayewardene. Can President Jayewardene run a viable political system even if he wins a third term? Mr Gandhi might find himself in an unenviable situation. Already a coalition, comprising Sinhalese groups and two of the Tamil militant groups, the EPRLF AND PLOT, have joined a United Socialist Alliance which was once headed by the assassinated Vijaya Cumaranatunga. Although the Alliance supported the Accord, a political coalition that needs further support to form a government, if at all, will have to seek the backing of other oppositional elements opposed to the Accord.

4. To add to the confused picture, members of President Jayewardene's government are reported to be in touch, if not negotiating with, some of the Tamil militant groups. Where does this multidiplomatic activity (Indians and the President's ministers) leave the Indian government? The Indian High Commissioner in Colombo has made known his displeasure.

The principle objective of this agreement, from a reading of it, was to secure India's geonational interests. This was apparent from the approaches of G Parthasarathi, Romesh Bhandari and P Chidambaram. But these geonational interests have yet to be secured in a treaty where there is certain to be hard bargaining on the Sri Lanka side.

My view is that India probably panicked at the future prospect of Trincomalee, and the outlet for the Voice of America. The Voice of America broadcasts will, according to Sri Lanka's Minister for Foreign Affairs, continue. The station, it has been agreed, will not be used for sending message to U.S. submarines in the North Indian Ocean. But who is to know?

Trincomalee is according to U.S. sources of no use to them. The logistics alone, a distance of 10,000 odd miles from the U.S.A. do not make it a viable proposition. India has therefore nothing to fear from a hostile power attacking her on her most vulnerable southern flanks from Trincomalee.

Provincial councils and the merger are dubious matters. The Indians are not tuned into the political culture of the Sinhalese political elites. The latter will not implement the bill in the proper spirit. The powers conceded do not resolve the most important question, the distribution of land. The arrangements appear half done and ill conceived. The only way is to start anew, further negotiations with the principal militant group and others concerned. The alternative is a continuing state of disequilibrium, a hopeless outlook for all the people of Sri Lanka.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted by S.U. Kedikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations Since Independence (Colombo. 1965) p.21.

2. A G Noorani, "The Neighbourhood", Seminar, New Delhi, Jan 1986.

3. See S M Mujtaba Razvi, "Conflict and Co-operation in South Asia", The Round Table (1986), p. 274.

4. Wariavwalla, Bharat, "Indira's India": A National Security State?", The Round Table, July (1983), pp. 279-80.