தமிழ்த் தேசியம்

"To us all towns are one, all men our kin.
Life's good comes not from others' gift, nor ill
Man's pains and pains' relief are from within.
Thus have we seen in visions of the wise !."
- Tamil Poem in Purananuru, circa 500 B.C 

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Selected Writings - Dharmeratnam Sivaram (Taraki)
தர்மரத்தினம் சிவராம்
(1959 - 2005)

"..நாம் இன்று அனுபவிக்கும் உரிமைகள் அனைத்துமே பேசிப் பெற்றவையல்ல, அடித்துப் பெற்றவையே.."

"..the conduct of modern warfare is not only about troops, weapons, generals and battlefields - it is also about perceptions. The manner in which a war is perceived by states and their populations today can have a strategic impact on its conduct..." Dharmeratnam Sivaram, One Hundred Tamils of 20th Century

2005...

Ceasefire Agreement  Year IV  2005 - 2006

27 April 2005 JVP’s war on NGOs and fears of neo colonialism
24 April 2005 ‘Don’t raise false hopes amongst our people’
13 April 2005 The writing is on the wall, and it is in red
30 March 2005 TV images: LTTE's next strategic dimension?

"It is now generally accepted that the conduct of modern warfare is not only about troops, weapons, generals and battlefields - it is also about perceptions. The manner in which a war is perceived by states and their populations today can have a strategic impact on its conduct. Real time images of a battlefield, flashed round the world can shape strategic decisions about the war and the mindset of one's strategic allies. For many years, the role of media as an indispensable component of modern war making has been conceptualized and discussed in military journals and symposia as the "CNN effect. Analyses in LTTE journals and the tenor and content of discussions that Pirapaharan has had with some foreign media consultants in recent years clearly indicate that the Tigers have been making an extensive study of the "CNN effect".  .."

27 March 2005  முப்படைகளுக்கும் மரபு வழி போர்த்தகைமை உண்டா?
Do Sri Lanka's defense forces have conventional warfare capability?
23 March 2005 Are Tigers militarily weak?

"...We read and hear numerous suggestions as to how the armies of Pakistan, the US or India should be persuaded to join the battle against the Tigers. One strategist speaks of a joint USAF-SLAF air exercise over the LTTE's so called airstrip in Iranamadu. The clamour for strong defence agreements with India and Pakistan betrays this strong desire to get a foreign army to fight the LTTE in case of another war.If the Sri Lankan armed forces have a tangibly patent military advantage over the Tigers, how does one account for this harping on foreign intervention?.."

9 March 2005 What is the larger picture in Pirapakaran's mind

Ceasefire Agreement  Year III 2004-2005

22 February 2005 War Remains an Option Three Years After Cease-fire
2004...
26 November 2004  Pirabakaran at Fifty - the political legacy

"It is not my intention here to interrupt the unceasing labours of those who love to hate him. There is little I can add to the invectives that Sinhala nationalist politicians, academics, opinion makers and editorialists relentlessly heap on the LTTE leader. To them he is the main enemy. But little is understood of him.

The Sinhala polity is always ready with neat but simplistic categories to condemn the man and explain him and his actions. Knowledge about him is still so superficial and anecdotal that even informed writers in Colombo assume the LTTE’s Great Heroes’ Day falls on Pirapaharan’s birthday on November 26. He is presumed to be so self centred that one writer thinks that his birthday is the “grand climax” of the Great Heroes’ Week. Nothing could be further from the truth. The desire to despise him is so great that the oft reiterated fact that Great Heroes’ Day falls on November 27 in memory of ‘Shankar’, the first LTTE’s to die in the war, is forgotten. And what does Pirapaharan do on his birthday on November 26? Cuts a big cake? No. He fasts the whole day in remembrance of one of his lieutenants who died 22 years ago..." more

21 November 2004 இலங்கையின் தேசிய செல்வத்தை பங்கிட மறுக்கும் சிங்கள தேசம்

English Translation: Sinhala Nation, refusing to share national wealth

7 November 2004 இராணுவச் சமநிலையைப் பேணுவதாயின் அரசியல் மயமாக்கல் தேவ

"நீண்டுசெல்லும் அமைதிச் சூழலில் புலிகள் தமது மரபுவழிப்படைபலத்தை சிதைவின்றி பேணுவதற்கு தமிழ் சமூகத்தை எந்தளவிற்கு அரசியல் மயப்படுத்த தயாராயிருக்கின்றார்கள் என்ற கேள்வியே இலங்கையின் இராணுவச் சமநிலையை எமக்குச் சாதகமாக வைத்திருப்பதற்கு முக்கியமானதாகிறது."

5 November 2004 தினக்குரலும் சிவராமும்

"..நாம் இன்று அனுபவிக்கும் உரிமைகள் அனைத்துமே பேசிப் பெற்றவையல்ல, அடித்துப் பெற்றவையே என போர்நிறுத்தம் ஏற்பட்ட காலத்தில் நான் திருமலையில் பேசியதை தினக்குரல் முன்பக்கத்தில் வெளியிட்டதை நான் இங்கு நினைவுபடுத்த விரும்புகிறேன். .."

31 October 2004 ஜனாதிபதி தேர்தல் வியூகத்திற்குள் பலியாகப்போகும் சமாதானம்

"இடைக்கால தன்னாட்சி அதிகார சபைத் திட்டத்தைத் தொட்டாலே மகா பாவம் என சிங்கள தேசத்தில் நாளாந்தம் புதுப்புது பரப்புரைகள் செய்யப்படுகின்றன. பல சிங்கள மேலாண்மைக் கருத்தியலாளர்கள் புலிகளின் தன்னாட்சி அதிகாரசபை வரைவை படிக்காமலேயே அது கிழித்தெறியப்பட வேண்டுமென காரசாரமாக எழுதிவருகின்றனர். "

24 October 2004 சிங்கள பௌத்தத்தைப் புரிந்துகொள்வது பேச்சுவார்த்தைக்கு அவசியம
10 October 2004 விடிந்த பின் இராமர் சீதைக்கு என்ன முறை..? எனக்கேட்கும் சிங்கள தேசம்

On the psyche of the Sinhala Nation

"..By allowing my friends and me to stay in their house in Colombo, Chandrika and her husband helped us to do our work in Southern Sri Lanka. During that time Chandrika used to tell me, "Do not speak to anyone who does not accept the rights of the Tamils for self-determination." ( Her husband, Vijaya Kumaratunge, was kind and supportive of our people and our liberation struggle, but he was assassinated by the JVP).What happened to this kind of Chandrika, the President? Why did she unleash the horror of the "War for Peace" on Tamils? If we have to find explanations for all these, then we have to do an in-depth analysis of the psyche of the Sinhala Nation. Based on that alone can we firm up our approach on how to deal with the Sinhala nation..."

6 October 2004 Geo-Strategic Implications of Sethusamudram

The Sethusamudram Project has a very important geo-political dimension.It would give India a firm grip on one of the world's most strategic and busiest sea-lanes. This would eventually give India very remarkable leverage in its relations with China, Japan and the US.

3 October 2004 தமிழர் பிரச்சனையை சிங்கள தேசத்திற்கு விளக்க முனைவது பயனற்ற செயல்
26 September 2004  உங்கள் செல்லிடத் தொலைபேசியின் குருதிக்கறை
12 September 2004 Sinhala nation once again desires a military solution  

இராணுவத் தீர்வின் மீது மீண்டும் ஆசைகொள்ளும் சிங்களதேசம் "மேற்கூறிய அனைத்தையும் கருத்திற் கொண்டு பார்க்கும்போது, சிங்கள தேசம் எந்த முயற்சி எடுத்தாலும் இந்தியாவைப் புலிகளுக்கு எதிரான நேரடி இராணுவ நடவடிக்கையில் இறக்குவது மிகக் கடினம் என்ற முடிவு பெறப்படும். இது சிங்கள மேலாண்மையாளருக்கும் புரிகிறது. அதனாலேயே அவர்கள் தற்போது அமெரிக்காவை நாடத் தலைப்பட்டுள்ளனர்."

5 September 2004 Sinhala Nation seeks Foreign Military Intervention

அந்நிய இராணுவ தலையீட்டை விரும்பும் சிங்கள தேசம் "இதுசம்பந்தமாக மூன்று விடயங்களை விரிவாக ஆராயவேண்டியுள்ளது. ஒன்று - தமிழ்த் தரப்பிற்குச் சார்பாக இலங்கையின் படைவலுச் சமநிலை கணிசமான அளவு திரும்புகின்ற ஒரு நிலை ஏற்படும்போது இந்தியா அதைத் தடுக்க எந்தளவிற்கு இராணுவ ரிதியாகத் தலையிட தயாராகவுள்ளது என்ற விடயம். இரண்டு - மேற்படி நிலை ஏற்படும்போது இந்தியா தலையிடாவிடின் அமெரிக்காவும் அதன் கூட்டு நாடுகளும் சிறிலங்கா அரசின் சார்பாக தலையிட எந்தளவு வாய்ப்புண்டு என்பது. மூன்று - எந்தவொரு வெளிநாடும் இங்கு இராணுவ hPதியாகத் தலையிட முற்றாகத் தயங்குமளவிற்கு தமிழர் தரப்பிடம் சமச்சீரற்ற முன்தடுப்பு வலு (யுளலஅஅநவசiஉயட னுநவநசசநnஉந ஊயியடிடைவைல) எந்தளவிற்கு உள்ளது என்ற விடயமாகும். இவற்றை வருகின்ற கிழமைகளில் பார்ப்போம்."

29 August 2004 அந்தரத்தில் தொங்கும் இலங்கையின் படை வலுச் சமநிலை
25 August 2004 ISGA bashing: Much ado about nothing

"The JVP has found in the ISGA a convenient means to take forward its political mobilisation to another level, steadily cutting grass under the Sri Lanka Freedom Party's feet. The ISGA, by and large, is a four-letter word in the south. It agitates many. It is an irritant to many more. All this is much ado about nothing. The ceasefire is the only tangible reality of the peace process. All talk about talks is empty rhetoric. All those who do not accept this fact are either scoundrels who are using the chance to push their own ulterior agendas or are genuinely misguided gulls who sincerely believe that things would start moving in the right direction if only the Tigers and the UPFA sit across the negotiating table. The ISGA, like all and sundry proposals and plans prepared and submitted by the Tamils since 1978, cannot be implemented neither in part nor in full, come what may..."

18 August 2004 Tigers dominate decades of Tamil militancy

"...A US army officer covering South Asia whom I met in Washington many years ago asked me why the Sri Lanka army is unable to raise paramilitaries in the northeast that are large enough to curtail the spread of the LTTE's influence in those regions considered key to the counter insurgency campaign against the Tigers. He had in mind paramilitaries like the right wing AUC that controls large areas in Columbia and terrorizes peasants who support FARC, the main Marxist guerrilla organisation fighting the state in that country. The AUC is estimated to be about ten thousand strong. It plays a key role in the Columbian military's counter insurgency campaign against FARC..."

15 August 2004 சுயநிர்ணய உரிமை, ஒட்டுப்படைகள் கிழக்குத் தீமோர் தரும் பாடம்
8 August 2004 சூடான் - தமிழ் ஈழம்; அமெரிக்கா இரட்டை வேடம் போட இயலாது
4 August 2004  ISGA entails concepts and structures of final solution

"The peace process has reached an absolute deadlock. But all parties involved in the attempt to make permanent peace in Sri Lanka - the UPFA government, the LTTE, sundry conflict resolution experts and the Norwegians - continue to say nice things. There is no doubt that the ceasefire is there to stay for a while despite the killings, attacks and the renegade factor. But the peace process (if one may still call it so) is at a dead-end..."

25 July 2004 காலத்தின் தேவை அரசியல் வேலை
27 July 2004 கருணா ஓடியது எதற்காக?
21 July 2004 Strategic positioning vital for military advantage
19 July 2004 நான் ஒரு மட்டக்களப்பு பிரதேசவாதி
14 July 2004 Can the renegade Karuna deliver his Big Magic?  

"...Life goes on as usual in Batticaloa town and in its interior. The Army has stepped up patrols and occasional checks on the main roads of the town. But no one appears to be too hassled by this. But whenever I run into friends, acquaintances or relatives, they invariably tell me that I am foolish to be back. "You would be shot dead like Nadesan. Leave now", they say. But Batticaloa is my home. This is where I was born and grew up. This is the only place in this wide world where the evening air is sweetly suffused with memories of the girls whom I once loved and the bars where I made merry in my first heady forays into manhood. This has been my home despite years of a deadly internecine war between the LTTE and another Tamil militant organisation to which I belonged, despite years of threats posed by the (formerly) much-feared 'Razeek Group', despite the dire uncertainties of life in the east during Eelam War III. (I am a reluctant sojourner of Colombo)..."

7 July 2004 Karuna affair: The military connection
May/June 2004 Audio-Video Presentation on Himself & his Work German Human Rights Server Interview with Sivaram Dharmeratnam,  May/June 2004  "Mr. Sivaram Dharmeratnam is well known for his role in the web site tamilnet.com. He spoke to us about his work and the repression faced by Tamil journalists a few days before his colleague Mr. Aiyathurai Nadesan was assassinated in the east of the island - the first 5 clips are of this interview. Part 6 was made after Mr Nadesan was murdered."

Part 1 - Part 2 - Part 3 - Part 4 -Part 5 - Part 6

29 May 2004 India will not court regional instability by taking on Tigers

"...It is also obvious that no western power has been able to manipulate the Tigers despite the presence of large Tamil Diaspora communities in the developed countries. The lesson that Colombo refuses to learn from the Indian intervention in 1983-87 is that Delhi's primary concern in Sri Lanka is to preclude outside powers from strategically positioning themselves on this island in a manner detrimental to its interests here. Therefore as long as the LTTE does not actively promote separatist sentiments in Tamil Nadu and as long as the LTTE refuses to become a pawn in the hands of outside powers, India may not find reasons compelling enough to do what many southern politicians and opinion makers would want it to do against the Tigers..."

22 May 2004 LTTE develops asymmetric deterrence to stall foreign intervention

When the Tigers say that the balance of forces between the Sri Lankan military and their armed forces sustains the ceasefire they mean that it is their military power that deters the Sri Lankan state from considering war as the chief means of dealing with the conflict despite the overwhelming Sinhala sentiment in favour of doing so. Here deterrence is not based on symmetry of military power on either side. Actually there is an asymmetry if one calculates the armed strength of the Sri Lankan state and that of the LTTE in terms of their military assets and access to war resources...Yet the LTTE has been able to achieve strategic parity of military force with the Sri Lankan state. The LTTE did this by pooling all its resources to launch a relentless assault on the military forces that the GOSL had disproportionately concentrated in the north between 1995-1999. This neutralised the defensive and offensive capability and debilitated the resolve of the main component of the Sri Lankan ground forces, which were massed up in Jaffna and the Vanni. However, the GOSL's resolve to continue the war was finally broken when the LTTE hit Katunayaka..."

14 March 2004 கருணாவுக்கு ஒரு கடிதம்
13 January 2004 Indo-Lanka Defence Cooperation Agreement: A matter of routine

Ceasefire Agreement  Year II 2003-2004

4 February 2004 Is Sri Lanka Truly Sovereign?
27 January 2004 LTTE will negotiate only with Parity of Military Status  

"I formulated the concept of the balance of forces between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces as the basis for the ceasefire agreement in a paper presented at a conference in Switzerland in April 2002. (Lt. Gen. Gerry de Silva presented the Army's point of view. But Chatham House rules prevent me from discussing details of the matter here). I argued that the LTTE leadership decided to start negotiations with the Government of Sri Lanka because they were unequivocally satisfied by December 2000 that they had achieved a strategic parity with the Sri Lankan armed forces and were in a position to sustain that parity, barring an overwhelming and sustained external military intervention...Here one should emphasise that the Tigers consider military power first and foremost as a means to negotiate political ends. To negotiate effectively one should have a clear understanding of the 'negotiating behaviour' of one's opponent...."

2003...
13 June 2003 Tokyo & the Cost of the Unitary State’s Internal Colonialism
5 May 2003

The folly of Eelam punditry

2002...

Ceasefire Agreement  Year I:  2002-2003

19 December 2002 What is India’s stand on the peace process?  

"...The US led coalition is doing the job of trying to settle the conflict through Norway. And Delhi is assured of keeping abreast of the developments by virtue of its legal status vis--vis the Tamil question which is guaranteed by the Indo Lanka Accord. We must not forget India has come to wield such decisive say on Sri Lanka’s strategic status in the region by managing and mediating Tamil militancy between 1983 and 1987 in its so called attempt to settle the ethnic conflict here. The US and its allies are doing exactly the same here now, though by subtler means. It is obvious to everyone that they are not making peace for peace’s sake. There is nothing called a free lunch in international diplomacy and power politics. Therefore, India may just keep watching the peace process and blessing it towards fruition as long as it does not give the US coalition great leverage in the affairs of the island – the kind of leverage that could undermine what Delhi feels are its “non negotiable strategic interests” in Sri Lanka..."

29 November 2002 Sinhala nationalists should rejoice 

"Sinhala nationalists should rejoice now rather than gripe and whine ad nauseam that Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and his men have perfidiously betrayed the Singhalese people to the LTTE. The world's sole superpower has reiterated its commitment to firmly support the Sri Lankan state to stop the LTTE from undermining its sovereignty. Richard Armitage could not have been more lucid when he called on the LTTE to renounce violence and to accept the authority of the Sri Lankan state in all parts of the island..."

28 November 2002 Creeping pogrom against Muslims in the South
21 November 2002 LTTE’s law and order machinery: drawing the line
31 October 2002 HSZ renders Jaffna IDPs in vulnerable position

A US state department official who visited Jaffna after it was captured by the army said that the peninsula provided a window of opportunity for reconstruction and development. Even today there is much hype about rebuilding Chavakachcheri, Jaffna town, improving telecommunication facilities, roads and tourism in the north.Thousands of tourists from the south visit Jaffna today. Ministers and diplomats come and go. New banks and insurance companies from the south have started business in Jaffna and are reporting handsome profits already. Business seems to thrive. Flashy new Indian motorbikes are on the roads everywhere. All this leaves the impression in one’s mind that Jaffna is almost fine. Little would the average visitor know that there are thousands of refugees living in run down refugee camps amid squalor and official negligence. This is the other side of Jaffna, a reality that the government pretends not to see..."

24 October 2002  A Hidden Hand behind Akkaraipattu Incidents

"There is a simple formula today for bringing down the UNF government by manipulating Muslim politics. One can precipitate a crisis in the east by instigating Muslims to protest against the LTTE. Then build on the crisis to make it difficult for the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress to remain in the UNF. Or, prod the SLMC or sections of it to make demands that the LTTE and the UNF cannot meet at this juncture. The incidents that led to the Police clamping a local curfew in the Akkaraipattu – Addalaichenai towns on the southeastern coast should also be scrutinised in this light..."

17 October 2002 What lies behind the uprising in the East

 "The incident in Kanjirankudah in which fifteen civilians were wounded and five were killed by STF fire on Wednesday has once again given a boost to those who argue that the LTTE is deliberately and systematically provoking civilians into attacking military camps. They see a sinister pattern in such incidents where civilians have raised not only their voices but also their fists against the presence of the Sri Lankan armed forces in several key points in the northeast. They also argue that the LTTE is using civilian unruliness as a cover to push the army out of strategic positions..."

3 October 2002 Rumour as weapon
21 September 2002 Demobilising is Irrelevant to Peace
6 September 2002 International Safety Net - You can't have the cake and eat it

There are no permanent alliances but only permanent interests that inform the affairs between states. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe appears to be sure of an international safety net to deter the LTTE from going back to war. In securing this safety net, he is attempting to do what many consider impossible in international politics. He is getting the support of countries whose strategic interests in this part of the world are diametrically opposed and hence in conflict. Can Mr. Wickremesinghe and his team of peace negotiators have the cake and eat it as well?

24 August 2002 The East: LTTE's Achilles Heel or Military Asset?  

The Hindu newspaper's Sambandan asked what was in my view the most useful question at Prabhaharan's press conference in Kilinochchi on March 10. Clearly Sambandan did not realise the import of his question at the time. ˜What would you consider the greatest military challenge that you had to ever face?' was his question. The LTTE leader pondered the matter for some time... the Tiger leader after the long pregnant pause said it was Op. Jeya Sikurui....The answer was Prabhaharan's unique way of acknowledging to the world the importance of Karuna, the eastern commander who was seated by his side at the press conference. Karuna was the overall commander of the LTTE's defensive operations and counter offensives against Jaya Sikurui. It was Karuna who commanded the LTTE forces that drove the army out of the Vanni..."

2001...

Eelam War III 1995-2002

23 November 2001 Western Mediation: How effective can it be?

"...persuading or coercing the LTTE into a dialogue is not the primary role that Colombo expects the west to play in resolving the conflict. The PA (the UNP and the JVP too), first of all, wants the western governments to arrest and deport known LTTE activists in their countries. Secondly, it wants them to ban the organisation as India and the US have done. And thirdly it urges them to stop the Tigers from collecting money. The LTTE has learnt from its Indian sojourn that all foreign hosts are invariably inclined, for very pragmatic reasons, to view its assets on their soil including manpower as the means by which they may eventually be able to exert diplomatic pressure on the organisation...."

2000...
13 December 2000 What is really wrong with the counter insurgency methods?

"Western counter insurgency methods have succeeded in putting down or effectively containing the armed struggles for social emancipation or for carving out separate states in the majority of the countries which adopted them under the tutelage of the Americans and the British. This is a fact that more often than not is buried by the third world's persistent fascination with the success stories of Vietnam and Cuba. The American and British governments have spent vast resources to study and constantly improve on their common and specific counter insurgency methods unlike the Cubans or the Vietnamese whose cash strapped economies would brook no such luxuries..."

19 October 2000 Lanka's climbing war budget gets diminishing returns
1999...
1 December 199 Towards a rigorous election campaign: Can CBK get the minority vote?
22 May 1999 Media Bias and Censorship in Conflict Reporting in Sri Lanka
9th May 1999 Tigers short of manpower ?
2 May 1999 Whispers of conspiracy find hot market
25 April 1999 Tiger hunt: Delhi's changing faces
11 April 1999 PA can't have it and eat it
4 April 1999  Kosovo strikes stir Eelam lobby
21 March 1999  Eelam War: Growing more complex
14 March 1999 Suspicion and mistrust, reality of Jaffna
21 February 1999 Where the bold dare to tread
14 February 1999 Towards a global Tamil village on internet
7 March 1999 Relations with Chennai will continue to trouble
3 March 1999 So why did the chicken cross the road?
17 January 1999 Those who wear the Tiger mask
10 January 1999 What the cats missed…
3 January 1999 Did President meet Gopalasamy?
1998...
27 December 1998 The year ahead, a tough story all over again
20 December 1998 Rations: the ludicrousness of logic
13 December 1998 The PA angel and a diabolical Tiger
29 November 1998 TULF: Stage set for new leadership
25 November 1998 Diplomatic Safari in S. Africa: Tiger-hunt in quagmire
18 November 1998 War is far from over - Whats behind LTTE"s recent recruitment drive? 

"The LTTE's recent recruitment drive provided another opportunity for predictions about the organisation and its intentions. Those who nurture an inveterate hatred for the Tigers on either side of the Palk Strait, saw in the recruitment campaign a desperate bid for survival, a pathetic attempt to replenish the ranks depleted by Op. Unceasing Waves II. The Hindustan Times which seems to have developed a penchant for gleefully insisting that the Tamil cause has run out of steam, described the Kilinochchi attack as "a flash in the pan" for the LTTE struggling as it were on its last legs..."

22 March 1998 LTTE moves on despite global isolation
8 March 1998 Tamil question knocking on the doors of Delhi
22 February 1998 Changing strategies and Kilinochchi gamble 
15 February 1998 The Operation Checkmate in Kilinochchi – LTTE style 
8 February 1998

The deepening theatre of operation - the Kilinochchi factor

25 January 1998  'Curiouser and curiouser'
11 January 1998  Jaffna: still on paper
4 January 1998  Why Prabha would reduce resistance
1997...
21 December 1997 Jaffna: where nothing is certain!
14 December 1997 Is there a future for the moderates?
7 December 1997 The scramble for candidates begins!
23 November 1997  Creeping advantage: can the government hold on to it?
16 November 1997 Counter- offensive quagmire in Jaffna
9 November 1997  LTTE takes battle to the US courts
2 November 1997 Tailing the Tiger trap
12 October 1997 Battle on A9: a battered theory of war
5 October 1997  Package won’t work
27 July 1997 Ten years after the Indo-Lanka Accord: not even the 'kovanam'
29 June 1997  Blinded in the Wanni quagmire
22 June 1997 These people have little choice
15 June 1997 The bloody lessons of Thandikulam
11 June 1997 To hell with the environment
8 June 1997  'Surprise' in Prabha's strategy
25 May 1997  Geographical dimension of Operation Jaya Sikurui
11 May 1997  UNP ponders direct talks with LTTE?
4 May 1997 Sojourn to Vanni tells all
May 1997 The Cat,  a Bell and a Few Strategists

"Many arguments about the best and most effective way of defeating or suppressing armed Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka have been ventured in earnest since the beginning of the Eelam War almost fourteen years ago. The latest of these can be stated thus: ‘The LTTE’s recruitment base is showing clear signs of diminishing such as the fact that they are relying more and more on women and children for new recruits. This is an irreversible trend given the social and economic realities of the northeast, whereas the army can continue to draw recruits from a population which is at least sixty percent larger than the one on which the Tigers have to depend. Furthermore, the total strength of the Tigers being one tenth or slightly higher than that of the army, manpower losses which they sustain in battles will have ten times the impact such losses can have on the security forces. Therefore, ‘manpower’ shortages will, in the foreseeable future, impel the LTTE to abandon the military option or reduce it to an insignificant and marginal guerrilla organization.’..." 

6  April 1997 Tigers think: Why talk, when we are riding high
23 March 1997 All roads don’t lead to Jaffna
9 March 1997 Forward march, many more miles to go yet
1996...
20 October 1996 After Prabha: question of succession
6 October 1996 LTTE has own 'medical corps'
29 September 1996 EPDP goes on offensive
15 September 1996 Playing roulette with interim council
8 September 1996 Govt. clings on despite stiff opposition
18 August 1996 Tussle for Titanium
11 August 1996 Target Prabha  
4 August 1996 Nine years on, nothing to show
28 July 1996 Unceasing waves unleash terror unknown
30 June 1996 Playing politics with the Package
16 June 1996 PA's new bank
9 June 1996 UNP gives nod for greater devolution?
2 June 1996 Pacification: key to end war
26 May 1996 Alliance plays politics with Tamil parties
19 May 1996 In search of solution but with honour
12 May 1996 Tamil Nadu Connection, Again
21 April 1996 Riviresa II and opening up of the 8th front

"One year has gone by since the LTTE began Eelam War Three on April 19, 1995. The major operation to capture Vadamaradchi and Thenmaradchi has begun. The Tigers have withdrawn all their bases from the region leaving behind a large number of attack groups which will harrass the army once it has established its positions there. An assessment of the first year of Eelam War Three will give an indication where things would be headed once the Vadamaradchi-Thenmaradchi operation is complete..."

7 April 1996 Give up east, at what cost?
31 March 1996 How free is the East today ?
3 March 1996 Game Plan for a Grand Slam

"..Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte has said that the war would be brought to an end by April this year. It is clear from the actions and statements of the Tigers that they have more or less assumed that the next major operation in Jaffna would be into the southern part of Thenmarachchi with a view to cutting off the peninsula from the mainland completely - a large scale version of Operation Yal Devi. (The LTTE's International Secretariat claimed recently that the government is delaying the operation because some senior officers in the army are reluctant to sanction it). It is also evident that the LTTE is not going to resist the offensive. It has pulled out almost all its vital military assets from both Vadamarachchi and Thenmarachchi and seems to be digging in for a long haul in the region..."

1994...
9 October 1994 Thondaman's Dilemma
15 May 2004 Govt's Counter-Insurgency Programme and LTTE's Military Response
8 May 1994 The Exclusive Right to Write Eelam History
1993...
15 June 1993 What went wrong between the Tigers and Premadasa
1992...

Eelam War II 1990-1995

1 May 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 1  Origins and Dispersion in South India and Sri Lanka "Tamil nationalism in South India and Sri Lanka can be described in terms of two sets of ideas and beliefs. The one, the purity and uniqueness of Tamil language and culture; the other, Tamil traditions which exalt military virtues and ideals..." more
15 May 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 2 Tamil Military Castes  "..For many years, until he became chief minister, Karunanidhi wrote under the pen-name Maravan. His weekly letter to party cadres was known as Maravan Madal – the Maravan’s epistle. Tamil militarism thus became integral to the Dravidian movement..." more
1 June 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 3 Tamil Militarism – The Code of Suicide  "Pulla Vazhkai Vallan Pakkam – the martial attitude of the warrior who goes forth into suicidal battle is mentioned by Tholkappiyam. The other works refer to it as Thannai Verttal. Duarte Barbosa describes the practice among the Nayar (of the Chera kingdom). It was later noticed by British officials as well. It was also prevalent among the Maravar (of the Pandya kingdom) from whom the suicidal Aapathuthavi bodyguard was selected." more
1 July 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 4 Militarism and caste in Jaffna "Tamil secessionism and Tamil militarism are two sides of the same coin. Both are legacies of the attempt by the British to demilitarize Tamil society in the 19th century. Tamil militarism arose from the grievances of the disfranchised Tamil military castes. Tamil secession was the result of the political ambitions of the classes which were promoted by the British to consolidate the gains of demartialization. Therefore it is necessary to understand the colonial strategies which were aimed at depriving the traditional power and status of the Tamil martial castes in Tamil society."more
15 July 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 5 The suppression of Tamil military castes "..One of the first concerns of the British as soon as they conquered the southern parts of India was with the ancient and ingrained “habits of predatory war” among the Tamils. The extirpation of these “habits” and culture was considered essential to establishing their authority in Tamil society. The Tamil region was ceded to the British in July 1801; a proclamation was issued by them in December the same year, whereby the use of arms was suppressed and the military service traditionally rendered by the Tamil military castes was abolished..." more
1 August 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part Bishop Caldwell and the Tamil Dravidians "Robert Caldwell (1819-1891) was the father of the Dravidian movement. He was the Bishop of Tinnevely – the heartland of the Maravar Poligars – during the times when the British were engaged in suppressing the Tamil military castes in the Tamil region...The intention of this study however is to show that the fundamental tenets of the nascent phase of the Dravidian ideology were essentially linked to the political and cultural legacies of the British attempt to demilitarize Tamil society.The writings of Bishop Caldwell presuppose a teleological project which was not uncommon to what were conceived as great intellectual undertakings in that era of empire building..."more
15 August 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 7 The Tamil Soldier and the Dravidian Diaspora
1 September 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part  8 The Twin Narratives of Tamil Nationalism
1 October 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 9 [Subramanya] Bharathy and the Legitimation of Militarism
1 November 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 10 Warrior Sons and Mothers
15 November 1992 On Tamil Militarism - a 11 Part Essay - Part 11 The Legend of Cheran Senguttuvan together with Post Script by Sachi Sri Kantha on the Significance of Sivaram’s study on the Maravar Caste and Tamil Militarism, 6 May 2005
15 November 1992

LTTE's Eelam Project and the Muslim People

30 July 1992 Counter-civilian strategies
10 June 1992 SL Government's speak soft, hit hard policy
7 June 1992 Govt.'s Dual Strategy Against the Tigers
31 May 1992 Can Indians wipe out LTTE
23 May 1992 The ban on LTTE and Tamil Nadu politics
20 March 1992 LTTE admits it holds political prisoners
3 March 1992 LTTE gearing up for battle of Jaffna
1991...
1 November 1991 On Cutting off Supply Lines
12 September 1991  Future of Tamil Nadu Politics
31 July 1991 The LTTE’s New Concept- Confederation
12 June 1991 War and Peace- LTTE way
19 May 1991 Coercive Airpower in the Eelam Conflict
1990...

Eelam War I, Indo-Eelam War 1976-1987, 1987-1990

6 May 1990 On Vadamarachchi & Anton Balasingham
14 March 1990 The Idea of Eelam
18 February 1990  Karunanidhi's Novel: Payum Puli Pandara Vanniyan
3 December 1989 Tigers two pronged strategy
29 October 1989 Waning importance of the rearbase in Tamil Nadu
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